A testbed to assess digital instrumentation and control and cyber security of nuclear power plants by An, Yongkyu
  
 
 
 
A TESTBED TO ASSESS DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL AND 
CYBER SECURITY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
YONGKYU AN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Science in Nuclear, Plasma, and Radiological Engineering 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016  
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Advisors: 
 
      Professor Rizwan-uddin 
      Professor William H. Sanders 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) are switching from analog to digital control systems, 
and digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to be used in all of the 
new NPPs. Digital I&C is expected to improve the performance of communication, 
maintenance, and signal processing. However, research needs to be done to ensure the 
nuclear-grade safety and reliability of these systems. The goals of this research project are to 
identify potential faults and to evaluate the resiliency of safety-critical digital I&C systems 
destined for use in NPPs. A test bed is developed for this purpose. This test bed consists of a 
model of a NPP, a main control room (MCR), and associated digital I&C controllers. The 
digital controller has a triple-modular redundant (TMR) architecture system. This device uses 
a two-out-of-three voting algorithm for the purpose of better reliability. A simple real-time 
NPP simulator is developed in LabVIEW using the point kinetics equation with feedback for 
the core. It also includes models for a pressurizer, a steam generator, and a pump. The test 
bed also includes a set of specialized fault injectors for injecting different types of faults into 
the system. A fault injection module is developed in LabVIEW in order to simulate sensor 
failures. The module contains a fault list manager (FLM), a fault injection manager (FIM), 
and a result analyzer (RA). This thesis describes the details of the test bed, the associated 
fault injection system, and the results of the fault injection studies which are carried out using 
this test bed to find critical sensor failures in NPPs. In addition, the performance of the RA 
module is also evaluated. Based on the results of the numerical experiments performed, 
conditions that require most care are when the faulty sensor data implies either steady state 
or sub-critical condition of the reactor. The RA module helps the operators in identifying, in 
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some cases, if the sensor data is bad due to a faulty sensor. The most vulnerable scenario is 
when the reactor is under steady-state operation and faulty sensor is stuck at its value 
corresponding to that steady-state. The operators in this scenario will not become aware if 
the reactor goes through an unanticipated transient, unless the simulator mode is switched to 
“transient”.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Instrumentation and control in the nuclear industry has been based on analog systems. Most 
nuclear power plants (NPPs) that are currently in the United States of America have been 
operating for several decades, and these plants have continued to use such traditional and 
physically complex analog systems. Measurements are also traditionally made using analog 
sensors. As utilities apply for license renewals for currently operating reactors to run for an 
additional twenty years beyond their initial license, maintaining these I&C systems is 
becoming increasingly challenging for three reasons: Firstly, continued use of these devices 
that require frequent maintenance, is becoming expensive. Secondly, expert manpower to 
maintain these devices is increasingly scarce. Last, the spare parts needed to replace 
faulty/defective parts, that are no longer being manufactured, are difficult to procure [1, 2]. 
These challenges have led utilities to explore conversion from analog to digital controls. 
Switching from analog to digital I&C may also lead to improved performance and safer 
operations. 
 
Recently, Huang and Yang developed a critical digital review (CDR) procedure to support 
guidelines for integrating and replacing analog with digital I&C systems [3]. However, 
digitalization of NPP I&C systems and control rooms is advancing slowly. In contrast with 
other industries, implementing a new technology in the nuclear industry requires additional 
caution due to the potential severity of consequences in case of accidents. Thus, further 
research and assessment is needed to ensure nuclear-grade safety and reliability of these 
systems.  
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    1.1 Digital Main Control Room (MCR) in NPPs 
A fully digital main control room (MCR) has not yet been implemented in any NPP that 
initially began operating with an analog MCR. Instead, some NPPs such as the Oconee 
nuclear station of Duke Energy have partially upgraded to digital I&C systems. Such NPPs 
are now in a hybrid stage, meaning that they include some digital controls, such as the 
digitalized feed water controller, the reactor protection system (RPS), and engineered 
safeguards protection system (ESPS). 
 
However, the newly designed Gen-III+ NPPs such as ABWR by GE or AP1000 by 
Westinghouse are designed to be equipped with fully digital MCRs. Construction of the MCR 
at the first AP1000 plant in Sanmen, China, has been completed and awaits the completion 
of construction of the plant reactor [4]. These new digitalized control rooms may require 
additional training of the operators due to the new and unfamiliar control panels and 
interfaces. The study of human factors engineering for operators may also be required in 
order to minimize the operational errors that can arise as a result of the differences between 
the old analog systems and new digital control systems. 
 
1.2 Scope of the Research 
    1.2.1 Motivation and Challenges 
A typical analog main control room (MCR) in a NPP is a legacy of the design from the sixties 
and seventies. For example, the MCR has a dizzying level of detailed controls and displays 
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(buttons, meters, lamps, other indicators, etc.). Figure 1.1 shows a picture of a typical MCR 
[5]. Such older MCRs require complex and frequent maintenance thus, requiring well-trained 
manpower. On the other hand, digital MCRs will be simple; all of the buttons, meters, knobs, 
etc. will be computer controlled with graphical interfaces, thus significantly reducing 
maintenance. However, because human machine interface will be entirely different in the 
new format of the digital control room, human error arising from unfamiliar interfaces, or 
due to lack of knowledge of the systems, could increase in a digital MCR. These operator 
errors can be reduced by extensive training and by developing a comprehensive transition 
plan.  
 
Figure 1.1. Picture of a typical analog main control room of a nuclear power plant [5] 
Cyber security is another area of concern in a digital MCR. Digital I&C systems use networks 
for communications between power plants and controls. Even though they use closed 
networks, there is still the possibility of external attacks on the system as the Stuxnet attack 
has demonstrated. In June 2010, Stuxnet attacked the industrial programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) that controlled Iran’s centrifuges [6]. The worm entered the system 
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through an infected USB flash drive and proceeded to infect the Siemens Step 7 software, 
thus destroying one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. 
 
The highest priority in any modification, such as the switch from analog to digital I&C, is to 
ensure that the NPP is as safe, if not more, than was the case before the modification. 
Therefore, switching to the digital I&C system requires additional areas of study to guarantee 
system’s reliability and safety. There are three important areas to be studied: 1) Digital I&C 
and cyber security; 2) safety and security of NPPs; and 3) human factors engineering. The 
most interesting and therefore most challenging area of concern is where the three intersect 
(See Figure 1.2). Any analysis of a new design, or a modification of existing design requires 
these three areas of concern to be present in the model. Carrying out these studies in an actual 
NPP, where all three are likely to be present, will be very challenging. One goal of this study 
is to set up a test bed that allows for the analysis of the intersection (the area in the red circle 
in Figure 1.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Research Areas of Interest for Conversion of MCRs from Analog to Digital 
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1.2.2 Goals of this Study 
Goals of this study are twofold. First, this study seeks to develop a test bed to simulate a NPP 
controlled by a digital controller, along with associated intermediate components. Second, 
this test bed will then be used as a platform for quantitatively assessing, using fault injection 
techniques, the vulnerabilities of integrating digital components in NPPs. In the future, this 
test bed can also be used to test the potential vulnerabilities of this system to cyberattacks.  
 
Use of test bed for such studies is not new. Test bed developed here will be distinguished by 
an in-house NPP simulator that will provide flexibility not available in commercial simulators 
(or in simulators for which only executable code is available), and by a physical digital 
controller which is being used in some nuclear power plants. For quantitative assessment, 
fault injection methods will be used to study system response, and how faults that are injected 
in some parts will affect other components. Field data will be used to generate faults to 
represent realistic faults and their frequencies. Tests also will be conducted to study fault 
detectability and the system’s resiliency when faults are injected. We will simulate hardware 
signal faults using software implemented fault injection (SWIFI) methodology.  
 
While the test bed can be used to study various aspects of the challenge posed by the analog-
to-digital switch in NPPs, only the issue of reliability of the system due to faults in the 
presence of the digital controller will be studied here. Issues such as human factors 
engineering due to the presence of digital MCR and cyber security are beyond the scope of 
this research work. Simulating the invasion of networks of the digital components, possibly 
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through communication channels, the resilience of the digital I&C systems can be evaluated 
in the future to assess the vulnerability of the system to possible attacks.  
 
    1.3 Overview 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the configuration of the test bed. 
It provides descriptions of the components and their roles in the system. Chapter 3 describes 
the real-time NPP simulator which replaces a physical power plant. Details of the model of 
each component of the NPP simulator are described in this chapter. Fault injection methods 
and the module developed especially for this study are described in Chapter 4. The theoretical 
foundation of the fault injection approach is reviewed, and the fault injection model 
implemented in the test bed, is introduced. Simulated fault injection experiments used to 
obtain the data needed to assess the viability of the digital system are introduced in Chapter 
5. Chapter 6 reviews the results of the study described in Chapter 5. Chapter 7 summarizes 
and concludes this research. In addition, the cyber security setup of the TMR device is 
discussed briefly for future research purposes.   
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CHAPTER 2: A TEST BED TO SIMULATE NPP AND MCR 
 
A test bed consisting of an NPP simulator, a multi-display digital control room, a Triple 
Modular Redundant (TMR) digital controller and a fault injection module is developed to 
allow for the simulation of possible accidental scenarios that may occur in the power plant 
as well as to assess the reliability of the digital I&C. This is designed not only to test faults 
from sensors, but also to explore the faults due to cyber-attacks made upon the system. In 
addition to controls in the main control room, any simulation of realistic operation scenarios 
of a NPP also includes data from the NPP being displayed in the control room. Source of this 
data is also replaced by a NPP simulator. Thus, there are two simulators in this test bed. One 
that is in lieu of the power plant, and another one that fulfills the role of the simulator at any 
NPP. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic diagram of the test bed.   
Tricon
Signal Transmitter 
(PXI-Chassis)
Nuclear Power Plant
Simulator (LabVIEW)
Tristation 1131
Multi-Display Digital 
Control Room
(LabVIEW)
 
Figure 2.1. Configuration of the Test Bed 
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The details of each component are discussed in the sections below. 
 
2.1 TMR Digital Controller (Tricon® and Tristation 1131) 
As state-of-the-art digital I&C systems are introduced in NPPs, operating the plant safely 
against either identified or unidentified faults is the first priority. A commercial triple-
modular-redundant (TMR) digital controller with three main processors has been developed 
to make the system more reliable using a 2-out-of-3 voting mechanism. In NPPs, TMR digital 
controllers are being installed, such as in the reactor protection system (RPS) [7]. Figure 2.2 
shows an example of the overall structure of the complete digital I&C system of the Tianwan 
nuclear power plant (TNPP) in China [7]. The red box indicates the area where the TMR 
digital controllers are mainly used. 
 
Figure 2.2. Overall Structure of the Complete Digital I&C System of TNPP in China [7] 
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The test bed developed in this study uses Tricon®, which is a digital fault tolerant controller 
based on TMR architecture and manufactured by Schneider Electric. This TMR is considered 
to be extremely safe and reliable because it has no single point of failure due to the 
redundancy of all components. Therefore, it satisfies nuclear 1E safety grade. (The 1E class 
systems are qualified for use in reactor safety systems by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) [8]) Because of this characteristic, the digital controller 
can be used in the Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD), Burner Management System 
(BMS), or Fire and Gas Systems (F&G) [9]. A picture of a Tricon® (one used in the test bed 
facility) is shown in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3. A Tricon® Machine in the Test Bed Facility 
  
It can be programmed to analyze the data and to take further actions based on the programmed 
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logic inside the main processor (MP). To create or download logics into the MP, a tool is 
provided by the manufacturer. This tool is called Tristation 1131. This is a graphical 
application specifically developed for this system. Figure 2.4 exhibits an example of the 
Tristation 1131 logical programming application. 
 
Figure 2.4. An Example of the Tristation 1131 Logic 
 
The Tricon® is connected to the NPP simulator. It monitors the operating status of the power 
plant. The Tricon® for the test bed purpose is programmed to detect the voltage differences 
that are generated by PXI-chassis, which consists of a pair of NPP simulators, developed in 
LabVIEW. It converts the detected voltages into numerical values. The data from the NPP 
simulator is then fed into the Tricon® and follows the programmed logic. If the signals are 
outside of the threshold values, meaning either the upper or the lower threshold, it sends an 
alarm signal back to flash one of the annunciators in the main control room. All of the 
programmed logics for this test bed will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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2.2 NPP Simulator and Digital Control Room 
The NPP simulator and its digital control room in this test bed are developed in-house using 
LabVIEW. The simulator is based on the 1000MWe Westinghouse pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) design [24]. It allows for real-time monitoring of the state of the reactor and allows 
the operator to control a limited number of parameters. The LabVIEW based front panels in 
the NPP simulator represent a digital control room in which operators can monitor the status 
of the reactor by observing graphs, charts, thermometers, pressure gauges, annunciators, etc. 
It also has knobs, switches, and buttons which allow for reactor control. Therefore, the NPP 
simulator code is dynamically linked with the parameter values controlled by the operators 
[10]. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show examples of the user interface of the front panel.   
 
 
Figure 2.5. Digital Control Panel in LabVIEW [10]. Panel shows initial setups, control rod 
controllers, SCRAM button, RPM controllers, and spray and heater controllers. 
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Figure 2.6. Digital Displays for the State of the Core [10], showing power level, reactivity, 
and fuel and coolant temperatures.   
 
This NPP simulator currently only models the primary loop of PWR. This contains a core, a 
pressurizer, four steam generators, and four pumps. Each component is coded in its own 
module, which are reactor physics and thermal hydraulics coupled together to form the 
complete system. All of the details concerning the NPP simulator for the core, and models 
for other modules are described in Chapter 3.  
  
Since our model, as stated above, consists of a core, a pressurizer, four pumps, and four steam 
generators leading to a large number of state variables, it is difficult to display all of the 
information on one screen. A commercial advanced digital control room such as the AP1000 
main control room uses multiple monitors and TV screens in tandem to display sufficient 
information and to control the system effectively. Large displays show the general 
information regarding the status of the power plant while small monitors display detailed 
information regarding each component and the controlling parameters. The operator’s ability 
to monitor and to control is enhanced with larger number of displays compared with the NPP 
simulator with less number of displays [11]. An example of the layout of the AP 1000 main 
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control room is shown in Figure 2.7. The actual multi-display digital MCR in the test bed 
appears in Figure 2.8.  
 
Figure 2.7. Layout of Main Control Room in AP 1000 [12] 
 
Figure 2.8. Multi-Display Digital MCR in the Test Bed. Details are shown in Figures 
2.9~2.11. 
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The composition of the front panels of the simulator in the test bed is shown in Figures 2.9, 
2.10, and 2.11. 
Tab Control
 
Figure 2.9. First Front Panel on TV1 and TV2 [11]. See Appendix D for Details. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Second Front Panel (Controlling Panel, Core/Pressurizer/Pump) [11]. See 
Appendix D for Details. 
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Figure 2.11. Third Front Panel (Controlling Panel, Steam Generator/Pump) [11]. See 
Appendix D for Details. 
 
2.3 Fault Injection Module 
According to Benso and Prinetto, fault injection (FI) is defined as a “dependability validation 
technique that is based on the realization of controlled experiments in which observation of 
the system behavior in the presence of faults is explicitly induced by the deliberate 
introduction (injection) of faults into the system” [13]. Fault injection has been used for over 
four decades and it is generally recognized as an important method of dependability analysis. 
It is usually employed either during the early design stage (simulation-based tools) or during 
the prototype stage (hardware- and software-based physical fault injection). Fault/error 
injection can be employed to conduct detailed studies of the complex interactions between 
fault/error and fault/error handling mechanisms. 
  
There are several types of FI techniques such as hardware, software, and radiation. In this 
research, software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) is used to simulate the impact of 
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hardware failures (e.g., malfunction of pressure sensor). SWIFI has multiple advantages: (i) 
it is non-intrusive (will not damage the physical hardware), (ii) it can be repeated (control of 
the experimental environment), (iii) it is observable (ability to monitor the impact of the fault), 
and (iv) it is scalable (offers a choice of automated or semi-automated to do extensive 
analysis). 
 
The purpose of the FI module is to simulate conditions that ensue due to sensor errors, 
controller errors, and communication errors. The basic idea of the FI tool is borrowed from 
the FARM model [13]. The idea behind the FARM model is applied to develop the Fault List 
Manager (FLM) and Fault Injection Manager (FIM) in this work. The FARM model consists 
of:  
F: A set of faults 
A: A set of activations that consists of a set of test data patterns with contained faults 
R: A set of readouts (behavior of the system) 
M: A set of derived measures obtained from experiment [13]. 
 
Benso et al. describe the three parts of the fault injection module: A Fault List Manager 
(FLM), a Fault Injection Manager (FIM), and a Result Analyzer (RA) [14]. These are 
developed in LabVIEW, and are linked to the NPP simulator. They affect either the sensors’ 
values or the controllers’ input signals. The full model is described in Chapter 4.  
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2.4 PXI-Chassis and Power Supply 
A PXI-chassis, several PXI cards, and two power supplies are essential auxiliaries which are 
used to connect together the entire test bed. A PXI-chassis and PXI cards manufactured by 
National Instruments (NI), are used in this test bed. The PXI-chassis enables the LabVIEW 
to either generate, or receive, both analog and digital signals. The PXI-chassis can hold 
multiple PXI cards, with each card controlling either an analog or a digital signal. In our test 
bed, it is placed between the LabVIEW workstation and the Tricon® for the purpose of 
transferring signals. 
 
An external power supply is also needed for the system. It is connected so as to support extra 
DC voltage to the rear panels of the Tricon®, known as phoenix boards, and to a PXI card. In 
this project, two 24V DC power supply units are used to provide redundancy. The PXI-
chassis and the power supply units in the test bed are shown in Figure 2.12. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. PXI-chassis with PXI cards (left) and Power Supply Units (Right) 
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PXI-6224, PXI-6723, PXI-6515, and PXI-6514 cards are used for analog input, analog output, 
digital input, and digital output signals, respectively, in this research. All of the data for the 
wiring connections from the PXI-chassis to the Tricon® are described below in Tables 2.1, 
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.  
Table 2.1. PXI-6224 Wiring Specification for Analog Input [15, 16] 
PXI-6224 Analog Input Slot #: PXI Slot 4 
Tricon: Analog Output 3805E 8-point each 4-20mA 
Mode Normal 
Channel Numbers Board: SCC-68 GND DAQ # Tricon #1 Tricon #2 
1 68 67 ai0 01.04.01  
2 33 32 ai1 01.04.02  
3 65 64 ai2 01.04.03  
4 30 29 ai3 01.04.04  
5 28 27 ai4 01.04.05  
6 60 59 ai5 01.04.06  
7 25 24 ai6 01.04.07  
8 57 56 ai7 01.04.08  
9 34 67 ai8  01.03.01 
10 66 32 ai9  01.03.02 
11 31 64 ai10  01.03.03 
12 63 29 ai11  01.03.04 
13 61 27 ai12  01.03.05 
14 26 59 ai13  01.03.06 
15 58 24 ai14  01.03.07 
16 23 56 ai15  01.03.08 
 
Mode Difference 
Channel Numbers Vin(+) Vin(-) DAQ # Tricon #1 Tricon #2 
1 68 (AI 0) 34 (AI 8) ai0 01.04.01  
2 33 (AI 1) 66 (AI 9) ai1 01.04.02  
3 65 (AI 2) 31 (AI 10) ai2 01.04.03  
4 30 (AI 3) 63 (AI 11) ai3 01.04.04  
5 28 (AI 4) 61 (AI 12) ai4 01.04.05  
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Table 2.1. (con’t) 
Channel Numbers Vin(+) Vin(-) DAQ # Tricon #1 Tricon #2 
6 60 (AI 5) 26 (AI 13) ai5 01.04.06  
7 25 (AI 6) 58 (AI 14) ai6 01.04.07  
8 57 (AI 7) 23 (AI 15) ai7 01.04.08  
 
Table 2.2. PXI-6723 Wiring Specifications for Analog Output [15, 17] 
PXI-6723 32ch Analog Output Slot #: PXI Slot 2 
Tricon: Analog Input 3700A 32-point each 5V  
Channel Numbers Board: SCB-68 GND DAQ # Tricon #1 Tricon #2 
1 68 34 ao8 01.03.01  
2 33 67 ao9 01.03.02  
3 32 66 ao10 01.03.03  
4 65 31 ao11 01.03.04  
5 30 64 ao12 01.03.05  
6 29 63 ao13 01.03.06  
7 62 28 ao14 01.03.07  
8 27 61 ao15 01.03.08  
9 26 60 ao16 01.03.09  
10 59 25 ao17 01.03.10  
11 24 58 ao18 01.03.11  
12 23 57 ao19 01.03.12  
13 55 21 ao20 01.03.13  
14 20 54 ao21 01.03.14  
15 19 53 ao22 01.03.15  
16 52 18 ao23 01.03.16  
17 17 51 ao24  01.02.01 
18 16 50 ao25  01.02.02 
19 49 15 ao26  01.02.03 
20 14 48 ao27  01.02.04 
21 13 47 ao28  01.02.05 
22 46 12 ao29  01.02.06 
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Table 2.2. (con’t) 
Channel Numbers Board: SCB-68 GND DAQ # Tricon #1 Tricon #2 
23 11 45 ao30  01.02.07 
24 10 44 ao31  01.02.08 
 
Table 2.3. PXI-6515 Wiring Specification for Digital Input [15, 18] 
PXI-6515 Digital Input Slot #: PXI Slot 3 
Tricon: Digital Output 3604E 16-point each 24V    
Channel 
Numbers 
Board: 
SCB-100 
SCB-100 
(COM) 
Pin # 
(+) 
Pin # (-) 
DAQ # 
(LV) 
Tricon 
#1 
Tricon 
#2 
1 1 9 P0.0 P0.COM (9) port0/line0 01.06.01  
2 2 9 P0.1 P0.COM (9) port0/line1 01.06.02  
3 3 10 P0.2 P0.COM (10) port0/line2 01.06.03  
4 4 10 P0.3 P0.COM (10) port0/line3 01.06.04  
5 5 11 P0.4 P0.COM (11) port0/line4 01.06.05  
6 6 11 P0.5 P0.COM (11) port0/line5 01.06.06  
7 7 12 P0.6 P0.COM (12) port0/line6 01.06.07  
8 8 12 P0.7 P0.COM (12) port0/line7 01.06.08  
9 51 59 p1.0 P1.COM (59) port1/line0 01.06.09  
10 52 59 p1.1 P1.COM (59) port1/line1 01.06.10  
11 53 60 p1.2 P1.COM (60) port1/line2 01.06.11  
12 54 60 p1.3 P1.COM (60) port1/line3 01.06.12  
13 55 61 p1.4 P1.COM (61) port1/line4 01.06.13  
14 56 61 p1.5 P1.COM (61) port1/line5 01.06.14  
15 57 62 p1.6 P1.COM (62) port1/line6 01.06.15  
16 58 62 p1.7 P1.COM (62) port1/line7 01.06.16  
17 13 21 p2.0 P2.COM (21) port2/line0  01.05.01 
18 14 21 p2.1 P2.COM (21) port2/line1  01.05.02 
19 15 22 p2.2 P2.COM (22) port2/line2  01.05.03 
20 16 22 p2.3 P2.COM (22) port2/line3  01.05.04 
21 17 23 p2.4 P2.COM (23) port2/line4  01.05.05 
22 18 23 p2.5 P2.COM (23) port2/line5  01.05.06 
23 19 24 p2.6 P2.COM (24) port2/line6  01.05.07 
24 20 24 p2.7 P2.COM (24) port2/line7  01.05.08 
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Table 2.3. (con’t) 
Channel 
Numbers 
Board: SCB-
100 
SCB-100 
(COM) 
Pin # 
(+) 
Pin # (-) 
DAQ # 
(LV) 
Tricon 
#1 
Tricon 
#2 
25 63 71 p3.0 
P3.COM 
(71) 
port3/line
0 
 
01.05.0
9 
26 64 71 p3.1 
P3.COM 
(71) 
port3/line
1 
 
01.05.1
0 
27 65 72 p3.2 
P3.COM 
(72) 
port3/line
2 
 
01.05.1
1 
28 66 72 p3.3 
P3.COM 
(72) 
port3/line
3 
 
01.05.1
2 
29 67 73 p3.4 
P3.COM 
(73) 
port3/line
4 
 
01.05.1
3 
30 68 73 p3.5 
P3.COM 
(73) 
port3/line
5 
 
01.05.1
4 
31 69 74 p3.6 
P3.COM 
(74) 
port3/line
6 
 
01.05.1
5 
32 70 74 p3.7 
P3.COM 
(74) 
port3/line
7 
 
01.05.1
6 
 
Table 2.4. PXI-6514 Wiring Specification for Digital Output [15, 18] 
PXI-6514 Digital Output  slot 5    
Tricon: Digital Input 3503E 32-point each 24V    
Channel 
Numbers 
Board: 
SCB-100 
SCB-100 
(COM) 
Pin # 
(+) 
Pin # (-) 
DAQ # 
(LV) 
Tricon 
#1 
Tricon 
#2 
1 26 34 p4.0 P4.COM port4/line0 01.05.01  
2 27 34 p4.1 P4.COM port4/line1 01.05.02  
3 28 34 p4.2 P4.COM port4/line2 01.05.03  
4 29 34 p4.3 P4.COM port4/line3 01.05.04  
5 30 34 p4.4 P4.COM port4/line4 01.05.05  
6 31 34 p4.5 P4.COM port4/line5 01.05.06  
7 32 34 p4.6 P4.COM port4/line6 01.05.07  
8 33 34 p4.7 P4.COM port4/line7 01.05.08  
9 76 84 p5.0 P5.COM port5/line0 01.05.09  
10 77 84 p5.1 P5.COM port5/line1 01.05.10  
11 78 84 p5.2 P5.COM port5/line2 01.05.11  
12 79 84 p5.3 P5.COM port5/line3 01.05.12  
13 80 84 p5.4 P5.COM port5/line4 01.05.13  
14 81 84 p5.5 P5.COM port5/line5 01.05.14  
15 82 84 p5.6 P5.COM port5/line6 01.05.15  
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Table 2.4. (con’t) 
Channel 
Numbers 
Board: SCB-
100 
SCB-100 
(COM) 
Pin # 
(+) 
Pin # 
(-) 
DAQ # 
(LV) 
Tricon 
#1 
Tricon 
#2 
16 83 84 p5.7 
P5.CO
M 
port5/line7 01.05.16  
17 38 46 p6.0 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line0  01.04.01 
18 39 46 p6.1 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line1  01.04.02 
19 40 46 p6.2 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line2  01.04.03 
20 41 46 p6.3 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line3  01.04.04 
21 42 46 p6.4 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line4  01.04.05 
22 43 46 p6.5 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line5  01.04.06 
23 44 46 p6.6 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line6  01.04.07 
24 45 46 p6.7 
P6.CO
M 
port6/line7  01.04.08 
25 88 96 p7.0 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line0  01.04.09 
26 89 96 p7.1 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line1  01.04.10 
27 90 96 p7.2 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line2  01.04.11 
28 91 96 p7.3 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line3  01.04.12 
29 92 96 p7.4 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line4  01.04.13 
30 93 96 p7.5 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line5  01.04.14 
31 94 96 p7.6 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line6  01.04.15 
32 95 96 p7.7 
P7.CO
M 
port7/line7  01.04.16 
From the External Power Supplies 
 
 VCC(+) GND 
p4 35 36 37 34 
p5 85 86 87 84 
p6 47 48 49 46 
p7 97 98 99 96 
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CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SIMULATOR 
 
A triple modular redundant (TMR) digital controller is the state-of-the-art device that can be 
used in the future to replace old analog controllers in NPPs. Given that this system embodies 
the latest technology, to be used in the new areas of the NPP industry, it is vital that this 
system be reliable to handle any accidental scenario. Before testing its reliability in a NPP, it 
needs to be tested using a NPP simulator. NPP simulators, such as RELAP 5, are available 
[29]. However, these simulators need high performance computing for real time simulations. 
In addition, there are some restrictions on the availability of the source code. For these 
reasons, an in-house, simple, but realistic NPP simulator is developed for this study using 
LabVIEW. 
 
The NPP simulator is designed based on the general layout of a 1000MWe Westinghouse 
PWR. It simulates the reactor core and related components. The control room is modeled 
using LabVIEW’s front panels, where desired state variables are displayed in numerical 
and/or graphical format. Data is displayed in real time. All features such as controllers, 
indicators, graphs, etc. on the front panels are organized using LabVIEW’s original tools. 
The main programming codes are written on the back panels. The back panels are able to 
coordinate using two different programming languages: LabVIEW’s original graphical 
language and Matlab code. LabVIEW is capable of integrating Matlab codes, so all of the 
governing equation are coded in Matlab code using the Mathscript module. The other features, 
such as while loops, system constants, feedback nodes, etc., use LabVIEW’s original 
functions. 
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The NPP simulator consists of four main components: a core module, a pressurizer module, 
four steam generator modules, and four pump modules. A schematic diagram is shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
     Primary Loop (PWR)
Core
Steam 
Generator
Pump
Pressurizer
 
Figure 3.1. A Schematic Diagram of the NPP Simulator 
Details concerning each module are discussed in the following sections. All of the thermo- 
dynamic properties are calculated by interpolating within certain ranges of the parameters. 
Only the primary loop is developed to determine the behavior of the reactor core. The 
secondary loop, a power generator, and a power grid will be studied in future work.  
 
3.1 Core Module 
A core module is a key component of the NPP simulator. It simulates the reactor core using 
point reactor kinetics equations (PKE) with one delayed neutron group, shown in equations 
(1) and (2):  
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(1) 
(2) 
 
where n(t) is the neutron density, ρ is reactivity, β is the effective neutron fraction, Λ is the 
neutron generation time, C is the delayed neutron precursor concentration, and λ is the decay 
constant for the delayed neutron precursor group [19]. The neutron density n(t) is normalized. 
The time-dependent total reactivity ρ(t) is the sum of all reactivities from initial core 
configuration (ρcore), control rods (ρCR), fuel and moderator temperature feedbacks (ρfeedback), 
and Xenon poisoning (ρXenon). The equation for the total reactivity ρ(t) is 
(3) 
The temperature feedback reactivity is given by  
   ,0 ,0( ) T ( ) Tfeedback F F F M M MT t T t                 (4) 
where fuel and moderator temperature are given by 
 
( )
( ) ( ) TF F M
dT t
K P t T t
dt
                      (5) 
.
0
.
( )
(1 cos( ) )
2(t, )
p inlet
M
p
n t Q
z mC T
HT z
mC

 

              (6) 
and αF is the fuel temperature feedback coefficient, αM is the moderator temperature feedback 
coefficient, TF is the fuel temperature, TM is the moderator temperature, Q0 is the peak linear 
heat generation rate in PWR, P(t) is the reactor power (P(t) = P0*n(t), P0 is designed total 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
dn t t
n t C
dt
dC t
n t C
dt
 




 

 

) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )core CR feedback Xenont t t t t        
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power, n(t) is the normalized power level), m is the mass representative of the fuel, γ is the 
thermal constants characterizing the core, Cp is the specific heat, and K is 
1
pm C
. Here, an 
axially sinusoidal neutron flux variation is assumed. Details can be found in references 19, 
20, and 21. 
 
In the point kinetics equations above, the temperature feedback coefficient is defined as 
1 1d d k dk
dT dT k k dT



                        (7) 
 
where k is the multiplication factor of the system, and is described by the six factor formula 
( 1)NL NLk fp P fP p                         (8) 
The fuel temperature coefficient, 𝛼𝐹, is given by [21] 
1
ln
(300 K)2
I
F
opr
pT


 
   
 
                     (9) 
where Topr is the operating temperature in Kelvin [21]. 
In equation (9), there are two unknown parameters, 𝛽𝐼 and p. First 𝛽𝐼 is defined as 
'
'I
fd
C
A
a


                             (10) 
where a is the rod radius in cm and 𝜌𝑓𝑑 is the fuel density in g/cm
3. 'A  and 'C  for 
different fuel type are given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Values of 'A  and 'C  for Different Fuel Types [20] 
Fuel A' x 104 C' x 102 
238U (metal) 48 1.28 
238UO2 61 0.94 
Th (metal) 85 2.68 
ThO2 97 2.40 
 
 
The p is the resonance escape probability and is given by  
exp F F
M sM M
N V I
p
V
 
  
 
                         (11) 
where VF and VM are the volumes in a unit cell consisting of fuel and moderator, NF is the 
atom density of the fuel in units of 1024, I is the resonance integral, 𝛴𝑠𝑀 is the macroscopic 
scattering cross-section of the moderator, and 𝜉𝑀 is a constant. The values of the product 
𝜉𝑀𝛴𝑠𝑀 for different moderators are provided in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2. Values of the Product 𝜉𝑀𝛴𝑠𝑀 for Different Types of Moderators [21] 
Moderator 𝝃𝑴𝜮𝒔𝑴 
Water 1.46 
Heavy Water 0.178 
Beryllium 0.155 
Graphite 0.0608 
 
VF and VM are the volumes in a unit cell (shown in Figure 3.2) and VM/VF is expressed as 
 
2 2
2
M
F
V b a
V a

                            (12) 
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ab
Lattice pitch
Fuel
 
Figure 3.2. The Diagram of the Lattice of the Fuel Assembly 
where a is the radius of fuel in cm and b is the distance of lattice pitch divided by the square 
root of 𝜋. 
_ _ _lattice pitch in cm
b

                       (13) 
NF is the atom density of the fuel in 1024 atoms/cm3. Thus, 
𝑁𝐹 =
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛
𝑔
𝑐𝑚3
𝑀𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛
𝑔
𝑚𝑜𝑙
   
𝑁𝐴
1024
                    (14) 
where NA is the Avogadro’s constant, 6.022 x 1023. I is the resonance integral which is 
represented by the formula below: 
𝐼(𝑇) =  𝐼(300°)[1 + 𝛽𝐼(√𝑇 − √300)]                  (15) 
where the temperature is in Kelvin. For cylindrical fuel rods, values of I are represented by 
the following empirical expression: 
𝐼 = 𝐴 +
𝐶
√𝑎𝜌
                             (16) 
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where a is the fuel rod radius and 𝜌 is the density of the fuel. In addition, the measured 
constants A and C are given in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Values of A and C of Different Fuel Types [21] 
Fuel A C 
238U (metal) 2.8 38.3 
238UO2 3.0 39.6 
232Th (metal) 3.9 20.9 
232ThO2 3.4 24.5 
 
Thus, the final equation of the fuel temperature coefficient is 
𝛼𝐹 = −
𝐴′+
𝐶′
𝑎𝜌
2√𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑟
𝑙𝑛
(
  
 
1
𝑒𝑥𝑝[−
𝑁𝐹(𝐴+
𝐶
√𝑎𝜌
)
𝜉𝑀𝛴𝑠𝑀
 
𝑎2
𝑏2−𝑎2
]
)
  
 
               (17) 
 
Table 3.4 shows general temperature coefficients for different types of NPPs. 
Table 3.4. Temperature Coefficients [20] 
 BWR PWR HTGR LMFBR 
Fuel-temperature coefficient     
Doppler (pcm/°K) -4 to -1 -4 to -1 -7 -0.6 to -2.5 
Isothermal temp. coefficient     
Coolant void (pcm/%void) -200 to -100 0 0 -12 to +20 
Moderator (pcm/°K) -50 to -8 -50 to -8 +1.0  
Expansion (pcm/°K) ~0 ~0 ~0 -0.92 
Temperature defect (%Δk/k) 2.0 – 3.0 2.0 – 3.0 0.7 0.5 
   Power defect (%Δk/k) 1.5 – 2.5 1.5 – 2.5 4.0 0.8 
   Xe worth (%Δk/k) 2.6 2.6 3.3 0.0 
   Sm worth (%Δk/k) 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.0 
 
In addition to rather fast temperature feedback, reactivity is also affected by some fission 
products. Time scale over which this feedback takes place is relatively longer (over hours 
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and days) than the temperature feedback. Xenon is the most significant fission product due 
to its enormous thermal neutron absorption cross-section. Given that the short-lived isomeric 
state 135mXe is negligible, we assume that all 135I nuclei will decay to the ground state 135Xe 
[20]. Thus, the amount of 135I should be calculated in order to determine the amount of 135Xe 
in the core at any given time, which affects the reactivity due to Xenon poisoning. The 
governing equations for the Iodine and Xenon levels are, 
𝜕𝐼(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼𝛴𝑓𝜙 − 𝜆𝐼𝐼(𝑡)                      (18) 
𝜕𝑋(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝛾𝑋𝛴𝑓𝜙 + 𝜆𝐼𝐼(𝑡) − 𝜆𝑋𝑋(𝑡) − 𝜎𝑎
𝑋𝜙𝑋(𝑡)             (19) 
Then, the reactivity due to Xenon poisoning is 
𝜌𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛(𝑡) = −
Σ𝑎
𝑋
Σ𝑎
= −
𝜎𝑎
𝑋
𝛴𝑎
(𝛾𝐼+𝛾𝑋)𝛴𝑓𝜙0
(𝜆𝑋+𝜎𝑎
𝑋𝜙0)
= −
𝜎𝑎
𝑋𝜙0𝑋(𝑡)
Σ𝑎
             (20) 
 
where 𝜙0 is a time-independent flux. 
 
3.2 Pressurizer Module 
Energy and mass balance equations are used to model the pressurizer module [23]. The model 
includes both the generation of pressure due to changes taking place in the core and the use 
of spray and heater features to control the pressure inside of the loop. According to Boyle’s 
law, the pressure of gas is inversely proportional to the volume, in cases where the 
temperature and the amount of gas remain constant. The pressure is thus determined by 
changing the steam volume in the pressurizer [22]. Figure 3.3 shows a schematic diagram of 
the pressurizer. 
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Cold leg
Hot leg
Spray
Heater
Vf
Vg
 
Figure 3.3. The Schematic Diagram of the Pressurizer 
The volume can be calculated starting with the following equation:  
𝑉𝑇 = 𝑉𝑔1 + 𝑉𝑓1 = 𝑉𝑔2 + 𝑉𝑓2                      (21) 
where Vg1 is the initial volume of gas, Vf1 is the initial volume of fluid, Vg2 is the final volume 
of gas, and Vf2 is the final volume of fluid. Using the mass and energy balance equation, the 
final volume of gas becomes 
𝑉𝑔2 =
𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒(1+
𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦
𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒
)𝑉𝑓1
𝑉𝑔1−𝑉𝑓1
=
𝑉𝑓1(𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒(ℎ𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒+
𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦
𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒
ℎ𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦)+𝑄ℎ)
𝑉𝑔1𝑢𝑓1−𝑉𝑓1𝑢𝑔1
        (22) 
where h is the enthalpy and u is the internal energy [23]. In the NPP simulator, the enthalpy 
and internal energy calculator is developed, and is used to calculate all of the thermodynamic 
properties to obtain the new value of Vg2. Finally, the final pressure can be obtained by using 
Boyle’s law, 
𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
= 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑉𝑔1
𝑉𝑔2
                 (23) 
When the spray is on, the new temperature can be calculated using  
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𝑇𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑡) =
𝑚𝑓,𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑝,𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑠𝑠(𝑡)+ 𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦,𝑓𝐶𝑝,𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑔(𝑡)
𝑚𝑓,𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑝,𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦,𝑓𝐶𝑝,𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑦
            (24) 
and if the heater is on, the new temperature will be 
𝑇𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑡) =
𝑄ℎ∗𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐶𝑝∗𝑚𝑓
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝑡)                   (25) 
After calculating the new temperature, Vg2 can be determined using the new enthalpy, which 
is then used to obtain the new pressure value.  
 
3.3 Steam Generator Module 
Energy and mass balance equations are used to model the steam generator module. The 
variables in this module are primary inlet/outlet temperatures, secondary inlet/outlet 
temperature, and pressures in each loop. A diagram is shown in Figure 3.4.  
Primary Inlet
Primary Outlet
Secondary Outlet
Secondary Inlet
Steam 
Generator
 
Figure 3.4. A Schematic Diagram of the Steam Generator 
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The model is given below: 
( - )PI PO PIQ m h h                           (26) 
,s SO,* (1 )hSO SO wh x h x                          (27) 
( )PI PO PI
S
SI SO SI SO
m h hQ
m
h h h h

 
 
                     (28) 
where Q is the amount of heat transfer in kW, PIm is primary inlet mass flow rate in steam 
generator in kg/sec, Sm is secondary loop mass flow rate in the steam generator in kg/sec, 
and x is the quality of steam in the steam generator [23]. Because the secondary loop is not 
developed and implemented in this simulator yet, quasi-static model is used to calculate Q  
for steady-state. 
 
3.4 Pump Module 
A pump module is developed using the mass balance equation. In normal operation, the 
pump’s RPM maintains a constant speed of about 1189 RPM [24]. Figure 3.5 describes a 
pump model.  
 
Figure 3.5. A Pump Diagram 
 
 
Flow rate (?̇?1, ?̇?2, … ) 
RPM (𝑛1, 𝑛2, … ) 
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The equations used in this module are as follows [25]: 
(29) 
 
(30) 
 
(31) 
where n1 and n2 are in RPMs, and ?̇?1 and ?̇?2 are in volumetric flow rates. In the normal 
operation of a PWR, the pump’s RPM are set as a constant. Thus, the coolant flow rate is 
determined by controlling the valve position.   
2
2 1
1
n
V V
n
 
  
 
3
2
2 1
1
Power Power
n
n
 
  
 
Work
P m

 

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CHAPTER 4: FAULT INJECTION MODULE 
 
The second goal of this project is to assess the reliability of the combined reactor and 
control room system by carrying out a systematic fault injection and error analysis [11]. To 
do this, FI methodology is developed and applied to inject faults in the system in either a 
direct or an indirect way. This FI module is then used with the test bed to assess the 
reliability of the system.  
 
In this research, a fault injection module was developed in LabVIEW to simulate the failure 
of sensors and controllers. The module consists of three parts: a fault list manager (FLM), a 
fault injection manager (FIM), and a result analyzer (RA). The complete fault injection 
panel is shown in Figure 4.1. We will discuss the role of each part and how it connects to 
the NPP simulator in the sections below.  
 
Figure 4.1. The Entire Fault Injection Panel in the Test Bed. See Appendix D for Details 
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4.1 Fault List Manager (FLM) 
The FLM supports a list of fault models which are represented by a combination of 
parameters which specify where (e.g., which signal), when (e.g., when core temperature 
exceeds a certain value), what (e.g., the value to be injected), and how (e.g., by overwriting 
a value in memory) faults are injected [10]. Table 4.1 shows the possible locations and types 
of faults developed for the test bed.  
Table 4.1. Fault Locations and Types of Faults 
Fault Locations 
Fault Injection Input Fault Injection Output 
Core Control Rod Ctrl Core Hotleg Temp. 
Pressurizer Heater/Spray Btn Pressurizer Pressure 
Pumps Valve Position Ctrl Pumps Flow rate 
Steam Generator N/A Steam Generator Coldleg Temp. 
 
Types of Faults 
Boolean Always True Analog Signal Stuck 
 Always False  Adding Noise 
   Shift Up 
   Shift Down 
   Signal Cut-out 
 
These attributes are generated, either manually or randomly, by the FLM and are then sent to 
the FIM. In the manual mode, the researcher must select the fault types to be injected first, 
and then identify reactor part where he or she wants to inject faults, at the time he or she 
wants to do so.   
 
On the other hand, the random mode injects randomly selected types of faults to the locations 
based on the historical statistical data. The statistical data applied in the test bed is tabulated 
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in Table 4.2. Figure 4.2 shows the FLM panel, including manual and random features. The 
detailed description of the FLM panel is described in the Appendix D. 
Table 4.2. Historical Statistical Data of Related Components’ Failure Rates [25, 26] 
 Failure/hr Failure/year 
Temperature Sensor 0.00000244 0.0213744 
Pressure Sensor 0.00000088 0.0077088 
Flow Rate Sensor 0.0000043 0.037668 
Software Failure Rate 0.00000114 0.0099864 
Workstation Failure Rate 0.0000028919 0.0253330 
 
 
Figure 4.2. FLM Panel including Manual/Random Injection Feature. See Appendix D for 
Details 
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4.2 Fault Injection Manager (FIM) 
The purpose of the FIM module is to inject faults into the system based on the information 
provided by the FLM. The FIM is implemented as a separate sub-module connected to the 
NPP simulator in LabVIEW. Once the fault injection parameters are transferred from the 
FLM, the FIM injects specified faults in the system immediately. Figure 4.3 shows the FIM 
panel in the test bed. 
 
Figure 4.3. The FIM Panel in the Test Bed 
In Figure 4.3, the FIM panel displays where faults are injected (e.g. input and/or output of 
the simulator), which components have the faults (the core, pressurizer, pump, and/or steam 
generator), where the faults occur in each component (e.g. hotleg temperature, pressure, etc.), 
and what type of faults are injected.  
 
4.2.1 Fault Injection in the Input and in the Output 
In the test bed, fault injection locations are divided into two categories: fault injection in the 
input and fault injection in the output. Both fault injections (input and output) are placed 
between the control panels and the NPP simulator. The difference between the two is that the 
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fault injection in the input intercepts control signals from the MCR and sends faulty input 
signals into the system. On the other hand, the fault injection in the output corrupts sensor 
signals from the NPP and incorrect sensor data are displayed on the monitors for the operators. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the fault injection in the input and in the output process.  
 
Figure 4.4. The Difference between Fault Injection in the Input and in the Output 
 
4.2.2 Types of Faults 
In Section 4.1, seven types of faults are listed in Table 4.1 (two for digital Boolean and five 
for analog signals). Information about the calculation of the “faulty” values is described in 
Table 4.3. “Signal stuck” displays steady state value on the monitors. “Noise” is produced by 
multiplying by sum of two random numbers (RNs). The random numbers are generated by a 
LabVIEW function that produces a double-precision, floating-point random number between 
0 and 1. “Shift up” and “shift down” functions show the values that a certain constant value 
is added or subtracted from the original sensor readings. The “cut-out” function always 
displays 0 to simulate disconnection of physical components. The “digital typed faults” in 
MCR Control Panel 
(Front Panel of NPP  
simulator in LabVIEW) 
NPP Simulator’s  
Main Code 
(Back Panel)  
Control Rods 
Spray 
Heater 
Fault  
Injection  
In the Input 
MCR Control Panel 
(Front Panel of NPP  
simulator in LabVIEW) 
NPP Simulator’s  
Main Code 
(Back Panel)  
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Injection in 
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this module can generate either true or false signal.  
Table 4.3. Equations of Different Types of Faults 
Analog Typed Faults Equations 
Signal Stuck Output = Steady State value 
Noise Output = Input * (RN1+RN2) 
Shift up Output = Input + RN*Input 
Shift down Output = Input – RN*Input 
Cut-out Output = 0 
 
Digital Typed Faults Equations 
Always True Output = 1 
Always False Output = 0 
 
Normally a random number (RN) is given the first time FIM is activated, and then gets 
modified using the original value until the session is finished. However, in case of ‘noise’, 
RN1 and RN2 are placed inside of ‘while loop’ and obtain random numbers every single loop 
to express as a real noise. 
 
4.3 Result Analyzer (RA) 
The Result Analyzer module analyzes the impact of injected faults on the system. The idea 
of the RA module is given by Rana, et al., and the basic structure of the RA given in reference 
27 is adapted for this test bed [27]. Figure 4.5 describes the structure of the RA in a diagram.  
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(Simulator)
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Compare Result
 
Figure 4.5. The Structure of the Result Analyzer [10] 
 
The RA saves a copy of the original input values from the control panel and computes the 
state of the simulated NPP using the original (i.e., those that have not been corrupted by the 
fault injection module) inputs. The reference system shown in Figure 4.5 has another NPP 
simulator module for calculating fault-free reference values. The state of the NPP which 
corresponds to the operation with the faulty data is then compared with the simulated output 
data from the reference system to determine the impact of the injected fault, and if necessary, 
alarms are then generated to warn the operators. Whether alarms are generated or not is based 
on the tolerance level applied during this stage so as to avoid detecting faults due to very 
small negative differences. The RA panel is displayed in Figure 4.6. The panel has a “fault 
alarm” with four alarms for components. If there is a fault in a core for example, then the 
“fault alarm” and the “core alarm” are turned on at the same time.  
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Figure 4.6. The RA Panel in the Test Bed 
 
In this test bed, the RA can detect faults only for the “fault injection in the output” model. 
The “fault injection in the input” model simulates defective control signals from the MCR, 
and those are mostly due to either software or hardware problems in the workstations. This 
could be another research area such as reliability of controlling software in MCR of NPPs. 
For this reason, it was decided to not apply the RA to the “fault injection in the input” module.  
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CHAPTER 5: NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
 
The test bed developed and described in Chapter 3, and the associated fault injection module 
developed and described in Chapter 4 are now used to conduct numerical experiments to 
assess the system vulnerability. The outputs from the sensors in this hybrid testbed/fault-
injection module are continuously monitored by reactor operators in the MCR. Sensor data 
are displayed in annunciators, charts, and graphs. The commercial sensors that are used in 
NPPs are highly reliable. The actual failure rates of sensors, according to the field data drawn 
from over the course of several decades, are very low, as shown in Table 4.2 in chapter 4. 
Based on the statistical data, only one or two faults may be expected for each sensor during 
60 years of operation. Moreover, the sensors are directly connected to the reactor protection 
system (RPS). Those sensor data pass through the RPS to the MCR where the operators 
monitor the status of the power plant. Thus, the actual sensor fault itself does not pose a threat 
to the system. Only if and when the faulty or corrupted field data being monitored in the 
MCR likely to “trick” the operators to take steps that might be incompatible with the 
condition of the plant, the sensor faults become of some consequence. The numerical 
experiments are aimed at identifying scenarios that may lead to such operator actions. This 
study involves injection of single or multiple faults into the (simulated) sensor data, in 
otherwise normally operating power plants, followed by assessment of the subsequent 
conditions of the NPP components.  
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5.1 Experimental Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, only the primary loop of a PWR has been developed in the NPP 
simulator for this study. Four major sensor values (hotleg temperature, coldleg temperature, 
system pressure, and flowrate) are identified for fault injection. The schematic diagram of 
the experimental setup is shown in Figure 5.1. The MCR and the NPP simulator are connected 
via LabVIEW. The sensor data generated from the NPP simulator is sent to Tricon®. The 
Tristation 1131 is connected with the Tricon® and is used to monitor the status of the logic-
operations in the Tricon®. The FI module intercepts the sensor data and sends faulty signals 
into the Tricon®. The RA module continuously monitors the input signals of the Tricon® and 
shows the condition of the sensors.  
 
TriconTS1131 MCR
NPP Simulator
FI Module
Digital Output 
Annunciators
Control Signals 
(e.g. Control Rods)
Analog Input
Hotleg Temperature
Coldleg Temperature
Pressure
Flowrate
Data Corruption
Faulty Analog Signals
RA Module
(NPP simulator and 
comparison function)
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental Setup 
Table 5.1 displays the permitted upper limit and lower limit of the variables being monitored. 
These limits are coded in the Tristation 1131. Crossing these values leads to activation of the 
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annunciators in the MCR.  
 
Table 5.1. Upper and Lower Limits for Each Sensor Value 
 Upper Limit Lower Limit 
Hotleg Temperature (°C) 345 295 
Coldleg Temperature (°C) 315 275 
Pressure (MPa) 16.0 15.0 
Flowrate (kg/s) 4550 4450 
 
Chapter 4 introduced the RA module to detect if there are any faults in the sensors’ signals. 
The RA module will be used here to identify and mitigate any condition due to faulty sensor 
data that might lead to undesirable operator actions.   
 
5.2 Experimental Procedure 
 
There are three types of fault injection experiments performed in this study: single-FI, 
double-FI, and triple-FI. Each FI experiment is performed with five different types of faults 
in four sensor values while also varying the magnitude of the fault. Table 5.2 describes the 
faults injected in these experiments. Changes in “shift-up” and “shift-down” cases 
correspond to approximately 10% change in hotleg, coldleg, pressure, and flowrate values, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.2. Types and Ranges of Faults in Numerical Experiments  
Fault Types 
Fault Range 
1. Hotleg T 2. Coldleg T 3. Pressure 4. Flowrate 
1. Shift Up ~30︒C ~30 ︒C ~1.5 MPa ~500 kg/s 
2. Shift Down ~30︒C ~30 ︒C ~1.5 MPa ~500 kg/s 
3. Signal Cut-out N/A 
4. Signal Stuck Values at Steady State 
5. Noise N/A 
 
The first step in the simulation procedure involves determining the number of faults, fault 
locations, fault types, and the magnitude of fault ranges to be injected. All of these factors 
are selected in the FI panel before starting the NPP simulator. After starting the simulator, the 
operator waits for a few seconds while the reactor reaches steady state, and then initiates the 
injection of faults into the system. Sensor data display and annunciators respond as a result 
of the faults injected. The operators are expected to react based on the information from the 
annunciators and GUIs displaying plant data in the MCR. The guidelines for the operator’s 
actions are described in detail in section 5.2.1.  
 
5.2.1 The Guidelines for Operators’ Actions 
 
The NPP simulator developed is based on the Westinghouse PWR model. The “Emergency 
Response Guideline Development” report was reviewed to create the operator guidelines for 
this simulator [28]. The actual guidelines include all of the emergency heat removal systems 
(EHRS) and passive coolant systems (PCS), which this simulator does not yet include. 
Therefore, some of the emergency features were removed from the list. The modified 
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guidelines for operator actions are shown in Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4.  
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Figure 5.2. Guidelines for Operator Response 
 
High Prz
Turn on Prz 
Heaters
Stabilize 
Pressure
Prz Level < Nominal 
Full Power Level
Return to 
Figure 5.3. Guideline for Operator Responses to High Pressure in Pressurizer. ① is in 
Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.4. Guidelines for Operator Responses to Low Pressure in Pressurizer. ① is in 
Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.5. A Flowchart of the Experiment 
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Figure 5.5 shows a flowchart of the numerical experiment. After starting the NPP simulator, 
an operator should wait until the reactor reaches steady state. Then the FIM is turned on to 
inject faulty signals into the system. If the faulted range is less than the RA module’s 
tolerance level, it cannot be detected by the RA. In this case, the operating procedure follows 
the flowchart in Figure 5.2. If the RA module detects where and what the faulty signals are, 
the operator should verify the conditions of the alternative sensors and will determine 
whether to shut down the reactor or not. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the numerical experiments are presented in this section. Results of only a few 
scenarios are discussed in detail here. The data for all of the numerical tests are given in 
Appendix C. The results are analyzed for two cases: with or without the effects of the RA 
module. The matrix for the experiments is shown in Table 6.1. The goal of these experiments 
is to assess if the operators can correctly identify the state of the reactor after the injection of 
the faults. Note that the signal may be a true signal showing the actual state of the equipment, 
or it may be due to a faulty sensor.  
Table 6.1. Experimental Conditions 
Fault Location 1. Hotleg temperature 
2. Coldleg temperature 
3. Pressure 
4. Flowrate 
Fault Type 1. Shift up 
2. Shift down 
3. Signal cut-out 
4. Signal stuck 
5. Noise 
MCR/Reactor 
Status 
OP: Safe operation 
OPC: Operation with conditions 
SS: Shutdown immediately 
DoA: Deceptive or Ambiguous 
RA Status D: Detected 
ND: Not detected 
Alarm ON: Annunciators from Tricon are on 
OFF: Annunciators from Tricon are off 
 
For the purpose of this test bed, the reactor at any given time will be considered to be in one 
of four states, given in Table 6.1. The determination of the state of the reactor is based on the 
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nature of the faults injected, and the ability to identify are mitigate. Reactor is considered to 
be in OP state if it is in normal steady-state operation; in OPC (operation with conditions) 
state if reactor can continue to operate after some backup components have been checked; in 
SS (shutdown immediately) if the reactor is in a state that it should be shut down; and in DoA 
(deceptive or ambiguous) state if conditions are such that may “trick” the operators into 
taking actions that are not consistent with the state of the reactor. It is this last state that is 
considered to be of most concern.  
 
As described in section 4.3, role of the result analyzer (RA), which is a part of the fault 
injection module, is to provide another layer of status-check of the system based on 
comparison of the sensor values with those coming from a reactor simulator. This becomes 
an additional check, in addition to the annunciators that operate based on the absolute values 
from the sensors. Hence, RA can detect deviations from expected values that are below the 
thresholds that trigger the annunciators. How small a deviation is to be detected is determined 
by a user-specified “tolerance” value. Result analyzer are either ‘detect’ (D) or ‘not-detect’ 
(ND) the fault signal. 
 
6.1 Single Fault Injection 
 
In this case, a single sensor is considered to be fault. That is, a single fault is injected in the 
system into one of four fault locations. In this case, redundancies in the system can be 
effectively used by the operators to continue the operation by monitoring alternate 
components. That is, once the annunciators are activated, warning of an out of range signal, 
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other signals can be checked to determine the status of the plant. For example, if there is a 
faulty signal for the hotleg temperature sensor, the operator may safely keep the reactor in 
operation by monitoring other components, such as the coldleg temperature and pressure. All 
of the related alternative sensors that can be used to ascertain if an out of range signal is 
indeed indicating reality, or if it is simply a faulty signal, are shown in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2. Related Alternate Components for Each Sensor 
Sensor Location Alternatives 
Hotleg Temperature Coldleg Temperature 
Pressure 
Core Power Level 
Coldleg Temperature Hotleg Temperature 
Flowrate 
Pressure 
Pressure Pressurizer Water Level 
Temperature in Pressurizer 
Flowrate Hotleg Temperature 
Coldleg Temperature 
 
In most cases, when an annunciator is activated, the operator can identify whether it is a 
sensor fault or a monitor parameter is indeed out of range when the system is in steady state. 
However, when the fault type 4 (signal stuck) occurs during steady state, recognizing the 
fault in the MCR is not possible. When the signal is stuck at its steady state value, it does not 
activate the annunciator and will appear normal unless the status of the plant changes to 
transient. 
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When the result analyzer (RA) module is available, it helps in recognizing the fault in the 
system. Without the RA module’s help, operators need to manually check all related 
components (Table 6.2) when an annunciator is activated. However, when the RA module 
detects a fault, the panel of the RA module displays where the fault is occurred. It can also 
detect the fault when the faulted range is within the upper and lower limits of the alarm in 
the Tricon®’s logic if the faulted sensor value is over than the tolerance level of the RA 
module. Table 6.3 describes the upper and lower limits of the annunciators.  
Table 6.3. The Upper and Lower Limits for the Annunciators 
 Upper Limit Lower Limit 
Hotleg Temperature (°C) 330 315 
Coldleg Temperature (°C) 305 285 
Pressure (bar) 160 150 
Flowrate (kg/s) 4500 3500 
 
 
6.2 Double-Fault Injection 
 
Double-fault injection involves any combination of faults in two of the four components in 
the system. Those faults are injected at the same time when the reactor is at steady-state. Fault 
types can range from 1 to 5, that leads to a total of 25 combinations. In addition, magnitude 
of the faults can be varied as well. (Injecting multiple faults at different times is not 
considered in this study due to the absence of emergency heat removal systems (EHRS) and 
passive coolant systems (PCS) in the current simulator).  
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 6.2.1 Faults in hotleg and coldleg temperatures 
 
Monitoring the status of hotleg and coldleg temperatures is important for safe operation of 
the reactor. These are auxiliary signals to each other. The faults in both components can pose 
significant challenge to the operator. Table 6.4 shows only the results that may lead to 
ambiguous conditions in the control room.  
Table 6.4. Results of faults in Hotleg and Coldleg Temperatures 
Scena
rio # 
Fault 
in HT 
Fault 
in CT 
Rang
e HT 
Rang
e CT 
MCR 
w/o RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT, CT) 
RA Status 
(HT, CT) 
1 1 1 10~20 10 DoA OPC 
OFF, 
OFF 
D, D 
2 1 2 10~20 10 SS OPC 
OFF, 
OFF 
D, D 
3 1 4 5~20 N/A DoA DoA 
OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
4 2 1 10~20 10 SS OPC 
OFF, 
OFF 
D, D 
5 2 2 5~30 10~30 DoA DoA 
ON/OFF, 
ON/OFF 
D, D 
6 2 4 5~30 N/A DoA DoA 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
7 3 1 N/A 5~30 SS OPC 
ON, 
ON/OFF 
D, D 
8 3 2 N/A 5~30 SS DoA 
ON, 
ON/OFF 
D, D 
9 3 4 N/A N/A DoA DoA ON, OFF D, ND 
10 4 1 N/A 5~30 DoA DoA 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
11 4 2 N/A 5~30 DoA DoA 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
12 4 3 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, ON ND, D 
13 4 4 N/A N/A DoA DoA 
OFF, 
OFF 
ND, ND 
14 4 5 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, ON ND, D 
15 5 1 N/A 5~30 SS OPC 
ON, 
ON/OFF 
D, D 
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Table 6.4. (con’t) 
Scena
rio # 
Fault 
in HT 
Fault 
in CT 
Rang
e HT 
Rang
e CT 
MCR 
w/o RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT, CT) 
RA Status 
(HT, CT) 
16 5 2 N/A 5~30 SS DoA 
ON, 
ON/OFF 
D, D 
17 5 4 N/A N/A DoA DoA ON, OFF D, ND 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 6.4 show the types of faults injected in each sensor; columns 4 and 
5 show the magnitude of the faulted ranges; and columns 6 and 7 show the state of the MCR 
(with and without RA module’s help). Last two columns show the status of the annunciators 
associated with the hot and cold legs, and the status displayed on the RA module (detected, 
D, or not-detected, ND). During normal operation, the operators depend on the annunciators. 
All scenarios except scenarios 9, 12, 13, 14, and 17 include fault injections even with 
magnitudes that are smaller than the threshold that will trigger the annunciators (e.g. shifting 
up 5 degrees in the hotleg temperature). Since scenarios with small-ranged faults do not 
trigger the annunciators, therefore the operators are not warned.  
 
In some cases, such as scenarios 2, 4, 7, 8, 15, and 16, a power plant shutdown may be 
necessary if RA module is not available. However, the RA module’s results may be helpful 
to avoid unnecessary plant shutdown. The final status of scenarios 2, 4, 7, 8, 15, and 16 
changes from SS when RA is not available to either OPC or DoA. Even if DoA state is 
considered to be equivalent to the SS state, the RA in at least some cases is able to deter 
unnecessary shutdown. The suggested operator actions and cautions are described in detail 
in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5. Suggested Warnings and Operator Actions of following faults in Hotleg and 
Coldleg Temperature Sensors 
Scen-
arios 
Warnings Suggested Operator Actions 
1 
Be careful if withdrawing all CRs for 
other reasons 
Check the RA module before actions 
2 Expect increased power output Check the SG status 
3 
Either RA and annunciator does not 
detect a failure in coldleg temperature 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
coldleg temperature 
4 Expect decreased power output Check the SG status 
5 
Be careful if withdrawing all CRs for 
other reasons 
Check the RA module before actions 
6 
Either RA and annunciator does not 
detect a failure in coldleg temperature 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
coldleg temperature 
7 
Hotleg temperature is not shown, 
inserting CRs to lower the coldleg 
temperature may lead to power loss 
Check the RA module before actions 
8 
Hotleg temperature is not shown, 
withdrawing CRs to increase coldleg 
temperature may lead to accidents 
Check the RA module before actions 
9 
Unreliable hotleg temperature with 
stuck coldleg temperature 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
coldleg temperature 
10 
Hotleg temperature always shows at 
steady-state 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
hotleg temperature 
11 
Hotleg temperature always shows at 
steady-state 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
hotleg temperature 
12 
Hotleg temperature always shows at 
steady-state 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
hotleg temperature 
13 
Hotleg and coldleg temperatures 
always show at steady-state 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
temperatures 
14 
Hotleg temperature always shows at 
steady-state 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
hotleg temperature 
15 
Hotleg temperature is not reliable, 
inserting CRs to lower the coldleg 
temperature may lead to power loss 
Check the RA module before actions 
16 
Hotleg temperature is not reliable, 
withdrawing CRs to increase coldleg 
temperature may lead to accidents 
Check the RA module before actions 
17 
Unreliable hotleg temperature with 
stuck coldleg temperature 
Insert CRs and find source of faulty 
coldleg temperature 
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As mentioned in section 6.1, fault type 4, which is a signal stuck in normal operation, could 
not be detected by the current RA module. Fault type 4 was not detected by either the RA 
module or the Tricon®. The scenarios which contain at least one fault type 4 can lead to 
scenarios in which there is no way to notice the fault during normal operation. However, this 
fault type 4 could be identified during the transient state. Hence, when suspected, the operator 
can induce a small transient to detect its existence.  
 
 
6.2.2 Faults in hotleg temperature and pressure 
 
The results of single fault injection in section 6.1 indicate that the pressure in the pressurizer 
has a good alternative component in the form of the tank water level. The operator can 
surmise the pressure by reading the value of the tank level. Hence, all of the faults in this 
section lead to “in operation with cautions” status, and are very close to the single fault 
injection results described in section 6.1. Some of noticeable results are described in Table 
6.6.  
Table 6.6. Results of faults injected in the Hotleg Temperature and Pressure 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
HT 
Fault 
P 
Range 
(HT) 
Range 
(P) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT, P) 
RA Status 
(HT, P) 
1 1 4 5~30 N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
2 2 4 5~30 N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
3 3 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
4 4 1 N/A 
0.3~1.
5 
OPC OPC 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
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Table 6.6. (con’t) 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
HT 
Fault 
P 
Range 
(HT) 
Range 
(P) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT, P) 
RA Status 
(HT, P) 
5 4 2 N/A 
0.3~1.
5 
OPC OPC 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
6 4 3 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
7 4 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, OFF ND, ND 
8 4 5 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
9 5 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
 
Although injection of fault type 4 in both components may be confusing to the operators 
during steady state, the plant can continue in operation by observing the status of their 
alternative components. Operator should check the pressurizer water level and the coldleg 
temperature to make sure the information of the hotleg temperature and pressure is correct. 
Table 6.7 shows the warning and suggested operator action.   
 
Table 6.7. Suggested Warning and Operator Actions following fault injection in the Hotleg 
Temperature and Pressure 
Scen-
arios 
Warning Suggested Operator Actions 
All 
Both hotleg temperature and pressure 
are not trust worthy.  
Operators should check the coldleg 
temperature and the pressurizer water 
level. The RA module helps in 
determining sensors that have faulty 
signals 
 
The tank water level can be used to substitute for the pressure gauge. The hotleg temperature 
can be estimated by reading the coldleg temperature. However, the operators have to decide 
which components have faulty signals (hotleg temperature and pressure vs. coldleg 
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temperature and water level). In this case, the RA module can help the operators to make 
right decision. Thus, the operators can keep the power plant in operation safely for a brief 
period of time until they make further decisions. 
 
6.2.3 Faults in hotleg temperature and flowrate 
 
The hotleg temperature and flowrate have close relationship to the power generation in the 
primary loop. The faults on these two components pose among the more serious scenarios. 
Table 6.8 and 6.9 show the results, and the suggested operator actions for this study. 
Table 6.8. Results of faults injected in Hotleg Temperature and Flowrate 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
HT 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(HT) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT, FL) 
RA Status 
(HT, FL) 
1 1 2 5~30 
50~50
0 
DoA OPC 
ON/OFF, 
ON 
D, D 
2 1 4 5~30 N/A DoA SS 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
3 2 1 5~30 
50~50
0 
DoA DoA 
ON/OFF, 
ON 
D, D 
4 2 4 5~30 N/A DoA OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
5 3 4 N/A N/A DoA SS ON, OFF D, ND 
6 4 1 N/A 
50~50
0 
DoA DoA 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
7 4 2 N/A 
50~50
0 
DoA DoA 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
8 4 3 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, ON ND, D 
9 4 4 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, OFF ND, ND 
10 4 5 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, ON ND, D 
11 5 4 N/A N/A DoA SS ON, OFF D, ND 
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Table 6.9. Suggested Warnings and Operator Actions Following Faults in Hotleg 
Temperature and Flowrate 
Sce
nari
os 
Warnings Suggested Operator Actions 
1 Inserting CRs may lead to power loss Check RA module to avoid power loss 
2 
Operators rely on the coldleg 
temperature  
Check RA module and insert CRs if 
needed 
3 
Be careful if withdrawing CRs may 
lead to unanticipated transient 
Monitor the coldleg temperature 
Check RA module to find faulty signals 
and to avoid the accident 
4 
Operators rely on the coldleg 
temperature  
Check RA module and insert CRs if 
needed 
5 
Stuck flowrate with no information 
about hotleg temperature 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
6 
Stuck hotleg temperature with 
increased flowrate 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
7 
Stuck hotleg temperature with 
decreased flowrate 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
8 
Stuck hotleg temperature with 
unreliable flowrate 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
9 Stuck hotleg temperature and flowrate Insert CRs to make further decisions 
10 
Stuck hotleg temperature with 
unreliable flowrate 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
11 
Stuck flowrate with no information 
about hotleg temperature 
Check the coldleg temperature and 
insert CRs if needed 
 
Table 6.9, scenarios 1 and 3 show some notable results. Scenario 1 can lead to power loss 
and scenario 3 can cause an unanticipated transient. Of course, moving the CRs to adjust 
reactivity and the power level are not as simple as we might think. There must be other 
checking mechanisms in order to keep the plant safe, such as EHRS, PCS, etc. Since the 
current version of the NPP simulator does not have emergency features, therefore, these 
scenarios cannot be fully analyzed. Hence, the determination of the DoA state should at best 
be taken as a warning. If the hotleg temperature is stuck at the steady state temperature, the 
61 
 
RA module cannot capture the existence of the fault (e.g. scenarios 6, 7, 8, 9, 10), and 
therefore the results are not changed by the availability of the RA module. Since the results 
of this section depend on the status of the SG and the coldleg temperature, this study will be 
treated again in section 6.3 which involves triple-fault injection by adding the faulty coldleg 
temperature sensor. 
 
6.2.4 Faults in coldleg temperature and pressure 
 
Faults in the coldleg temperature and pressure in the pressurizer show results similar to the 
results obtained for faults in hotleg temperature and pressure as discussed in section 6.2.2. 
Only some of the results of this study are shown in Table 6.10. Table 6.11 summarizes the 
warnings and suggested operations for all cases.  
Table 6.10. Results of faults injected in the Coldleg Temperature and Pressure 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
CT 
Fault 
P 
Range 
(CT) 
Range 
(P) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(CT, P) 
RA Status 
(CT, P) 
1 1 4 5~30 N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
2 2 4 5~30 N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
3 3 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
4 4 1 N/A 
0.3~1.
5 
OPC OPC 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
5 4 2 N/A 
0.3~1.
5 
OPC OPC 
OFF, 
ON/OFF 
ND, D 
6 4 3 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
7 4 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, OFF ND, ND 
8 4 5 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
9 5 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
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Table 6.11. Suggested Warning and Operator Actions Following Faults in Coldleg 
Temperature and Pressure 
Sce
nari
os 
Warning Suggested Operator Actions 
All 
Sce
nari
os 
Both the coldleg temperature and 
pressure are not trust worthy 
Operators should check the hotleg 
temperature and the pressurizer water 
level. The RA module helps to identify 
the sensors that have faulty signals 
 
Again, pressure can be substituted by the pressurizer tank water level. By checking the tank 
water level and the RA module, the operation may continue till the pressure gauge has been 
checked. The operators need to focus on the faulty coldleg temperature, which is the same 
scenario as discussed in section 6.1. In this case, the role of the RA module is important, 
because monitoring the hotleg temperature is important to keep the reactor safe. 
 
6.2.5 Faults in coldleg temperature and flowrate 
 
Table 6.12. Results of faults injected in the Coldleg Temperature and Flowrate 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
CT 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(CT) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(CT, FL) 
RA Status 
(CT, FL) 
1 1 4 5~30 N/A DoA OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
2 2 1 5~30 
50~50
0 
DoA OPC 
ON/OFF, 
ON 
D, D 
3 2 4 5~30 N/A DoA OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
4 3 4 N/A N/A DoA OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
5 4 1 N/A 
50~50
0 
DoA OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
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Table 6.12. (con’t) 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
CT 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(CT) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(CT, FL) 
RA Status 
(CT, FL) 
6 4 2 N/A 
50~50
0 
DoA OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
7 4 3 N/A N/A DoA OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
8 4 4 N/A N/A DoA DoA OFF, OFF ND, ND 
9 4 5 N/A N/A DoA OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
10 5 4 N/A N/A DoA OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
 
Table 6.13. Suggested Warnings and Operator Actions Following Faults in the Coldleg 
Temperature and Flowrate 
Sce
nari
o # 
Warnings Suggested Operator Actions 
1 
Hard to detect the faulty signal in 
flowrate  
Check the hotleg temperature and RA 
module 
2 
Either withdrawing CRs or close a 
valve to decrease the flowrate may lead 
unanticipated transient 
Check RA module and insert CRs to 
avoid unanticipated transient 
3 
Hard to detect the faulty signal in 
flowrate 
Check the hotleg temperature and RA 
module 
4 
Hard to detect the faulty signal in 
flowrate 
Check the hotleg temperature and RA 
module 
5 
Stuck the coldleg temperature with 
increased flowrate 
Check the RA module and hotleg 
temperature 
6 
Stuck the coldleg temperature with 
decreased flowrate 
Check the RA module and hotleg 
temperature 
7 
Stuck the coldleg temperature with no 
flowrate information 
Check the RA module and hotleg 
temperature 
8 
Stuck both the coldleg temperature and 
flowrate 
Pull down CRs to make further 
decisions 
9 
Stuck the coldleg temperature with no 
flowrate information 
Check the RA module and hotleg 
temperature 
10 
Hard to detect the faulty signal in 
flowrate 
Check the hotleg temperature and RA 
module 
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Injecting faults in coldleg temperature and flowrate is among the relatively benign scenarios. 
Especially with the RA module’s assistance, most consequences switch from the DoA to OPC. 
However, without the RA module, the situation may change significantly. For example, the 
scenario 2 has a high potential to lead an accident without the RA module’s help if an operator 
decreases the flowrate to increase the coolant temperature. Since the coldleg temperature is 
closely related to the hotleg temperature and the condition of the SG, this scenario will be 
treated again in the triple-fault injection study.  
 
6.2.6 Faults in pressure and flowrate 
 
This scenario has the least negative consequences among all studied. The pressure in the 
pressurizer has an alternative component, tank level, and some components which control 
flowrates such as pumps, emergency pumps, PCS, etc. are present on site ready for 
emergency in real NPPs. Faulty flowrate signals become serious when accompanied with 
temperature sensor failures in the system. Table 6.14 and 6.15 show the results of this study. 
Table 6.14. Results of faults injected in the Pressure and Flowrate 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
P 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(P) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm  
(P, FL) 
RA Status 
(P, FL) 
1 1 4 
0.3~1.
5 
N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
2 2 4 
0.3~1.
5 
N/A OPC OPC 
ON/OFF, 
OFF 
D, ND 
3 3 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
4 4 1 N/A 
50~50
0 
OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
5 4 2 N/A 
50~50
0 
OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
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Table 6.14. (con’t) 
Scen
ario
# 
Fault 
P 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(P) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm  
(P, FL) 
RA Status 
(P, FL) 
6 4 3 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
7 4 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, OFF ND, ND 
8 4 5 N/A N/A OPC OPC OFF, ON ND, D 
9 5 4 N/A N/A OPC OPC ON, OFF D, ND 
 
Table 6.15. Suggested Warnings and Operator Actions Following Faults in Pressure and 
Flowrate 
Scenario # Warnings Suggested Operator Actions 
1~6, 8,9 
Pressure has a substitute (Tank level) 
Flowrate does not affect much unless 
there are changes in hotleg and coldleg 
temperatures 
 
Check RA module 
Monitor pressurizer tank level, 
hotleg and coldleg temperature 
7 
Hard to detect that both signals are 
stuck 
Insert CRs while making further 
decisions 
 
The backup components such as tank water level, hotleg temperature, and coldleg 
temperature and the RA module replace the missing information of pressure and flowrate 
well. Thus, all states are “operations with cautions”, and no significant impact is expected for 
this case. 
 
6.3 Triple-Fault Injection 
 
In this section, three faults are injected into the system at the same time. Based on the results 
of the double-fault injection studies reported in the previous sections, hotleg temperature, 
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coldleg temperature, and flowrate are selected. Since these components can be used as 
backups each other, serious consequences should be expected. Tables 6.16 and 6.17 describe 
only noticeable results of this assessment, and the rest of the results are given in Appendix C.  
 
Table 6.16. Results of faults injected in the Hotleg Temperature, Coldleg Temperature and 
Flowrate 
Scena
rio # 
Fault 
HT 
Fault 
CT 
Fault 
FL 
Range 
(HT) 
Range 
(CT) 
Range 
(FL) 
MCR 
w/o 
RA 
MCR 
w/ RA 
Alarm 
(HT,CT,FL) 
RA Status 
(HT,CT,FL) 
1 2 2 1 5~30 5~30 
50~50
0 
DoA SS 
D/ND, 
D/ND, D 
ON/OFF, 
ON/OFF, ON 
2 4 4 4 N/A N/A N/A DoA DoA 
ND, ND, 
ND 
OFF, OFF, 
OFF 
 
Table 6.17. Suggested Warnings and Operator Actions Following Faults in the Hotleg 
Temperature, Coldleg Temperature and Flowrate 
Sce
nari
o # 
Warnings Suggested Operator Actions 
1 
Operator may have a chance to 
withdraw the CRs to increase 
temperatures while decreasing the 
flowrate. This may lead to an 
unanticipated transient for an accident. 
Check RA module 
Insert CRs to avoid power elevation 
2 
The sensor values from major 
components are not reliable. In 
addition, it is hard to detect the 
existence of the faults in the system. 
RA module cannot detect the faults 
Insert CRs to make a further decision if 
there is a chance 
 
In scenario 1, temperatures of both hotleg and coldleg are decreased and the flowrate is 
increased. This may lead the operators to think that the reactor is in a subcritical condition. 
If RA module doesn’t assist, the operator may decide to pull CRs out to increase reactivity, 
since all of the parameters exhibit subcritical conditions. However, if operators check the RA 
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module, they may insert CRs and keep the reactor in subcritical status to earn more time 
while checking the status of the NPP. Thus, the RA module’s assistance mitigate escaping 
from a potential accident.  
 
The scenario #2 includes “signal stuck” for all components. In normal operation, these faults 
cannot be detected. Furthermore, the current version of the RA module is also not able to 
detect this type of fault (On the other hand, these can be detected easily during transient). 
Therefore, operators should check all components and data carefully and lower the power 
level while they check for the existence of the faults if they have an ambiguous situation.  
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The larger goal of this project has been to develop a methodology to determine the reliability 
of the digital I&C systems with the state-of-the-art TMR digital controllers as they are 
incorporated in NPPs. The first step carried out in this thesis was to develop a testbed not 
only to test the safety level of the TMR digital controllers, but also to simulate the effects on 
the NPPs with digitalized MCR. To achieve this step, a real time in-house NPP simulator has 
been developed in LabVIEW that includes components of the primary loop of the PWR. The 
core module uses the point kinetics model with temperature feedbacks. The other components 
such as a pressurizer, a pump, and a steam generator are based on the energy and mass balance 
equations. The PXI-chassis is used to establish communication between the NPP simulator 
and the TMR controller (Tricon®). The simple code written in Tristation 1131 works well to 
initiate the annunciators in the MCR during normal operation. Fault injection tools are 
developed to simulate either analog or digital faults in the system. In this study, impact of 
sensor failures generated by the fault injection tool are evaluated. The results in chapter 6 
show that signals stuck, especially at their steady state values, on multiple sensors constitute 
one of the critical scenarios. Sensor values stuck at their steady-state values suggest normal 
operation and hide any transients from the operators. This has a potential to aggravate 
operating conditions. Another notable scenario involves displaying faulty sensor signals on 
multiple locations to display subcritical conditions to the operators in the MCR. For example, 
decreasing hotleg and coldleg temperatures with the increased flowrate may lead to such a 
situation. If the operator’s action triggers an increase in the reactivity and the power level, 
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the results could lead to supercritical conditions. Identifying this scenario during normal 
operation is very important. The U.S.NRC defines such a situation as an accident in section 
15.1 in the NUREG-75/087 [30]. Such a “fake” accident caused by faulty sensor signals must 
be filtered out to avoid time, energy, and economic losses during the operation. The 
methodology of the RA module introduced in this study could be one possible solution. By 
checking and comparing the main informative display and the RA module, the faulty sensor 
signals may be detected and this may help mitigate a chance of unintentionally introducing 
reactivity into a critical reactor. 
 
During this study, several areas are identified that need to be studied in the future to achieve 
the larger goal of this project. The next section describes potential areas for additional 
research in the future.    
 
7.1 Future Research 
7.2.1 Upgrading NPP Simulator 
 
The current version of the NPP simulator only has a primary loop. Hence, it is not capable of 
properly simulating the effect of the SGs and the external power generation. The secondary 
loop of the PWR needs to be developed and added to the LabVIEW simulator. Emergency 
handling systems such as EHRS or PCS should also be added in order to simulate accident 
scenarios and to determine the impact on the NPPs. Fault injection modules should be 
updated using faults that can be injected into relevant locations.  
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7.1.2 Upgrading RA Module 
 
The current version of the RA module is only capable of detecting faults when the sensor 
values are different than the reference values. Thus, it was impossible to find faults in this 
study when the faulty signals were stuck at the steady-state level. Moreover, though the RA 
module can detect the existence of the faults in the system, it is not capable of identifying the 
magnitude of the fault (differences from the reference values). These limitations in the RA 
module can be removed. 
 
7.1.3 Cyber Security 
 
Studying the cyber security of the digital I&C controller is another aspect of this larger project. 
The digital controllers in this study, Tricon®, were placed between the NPP and the MCR. All 
of the sensor values passed through the digital controllers before reaching the MCR. 
According to statistical data, the sensors in NPPs are very reliable and exhibit extremely low 
failure rates. Using the critical scenarios which are identified in this study, a Man-in-the-
Middle (MitM) attack can be developed and deployed between the Tricon® and Tristation 
1131 to demonstrate the potential impact of a cyber-attack. A tool similar to the RA module 
can be developed to detect and analyze cyber-attacks on the system.  
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APPENDIX A: NPP SIMULATOR CODES 
 
    A.1. Complete Layout of the NPP Simulator 
 
The schematic diagram of the primary loop of the PWR is shown in Figure 3.1 of the chapter 
3.  
     Primary Loop (PWR)
Core
Steam 
Generator
Pump
Pressurizer
 
Figure A.1. A Schematic Diagram of the NPP Simulator (from chapter 3) 
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Figure A.2. Complete Layout of the NPP Simulator 
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    A.2. Multi-Display Front Panels 
 A.2.1 Front Panel 1-1 (FP1-1) 
 
The figure below shows the front panel 1-1. 
 
 
Figure A.3. The Front Panel of FP1-1 
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Figure A.4. Complete Code of FP1-1 
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Figure A.6. Code in Detail, Part 2 of FP1-1 
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Figure A.7. Code in Detail, Part 3 of FP1-1 
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Figure A.8. Code in Detail, Part 4 of FP1-1 
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Figure A.9. Code in Detail, Part 5 of FP1-1 
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Figure A.10. Code in Detail, Part 6 of FP1-1 
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A.2.2 Front Panel 1-2 (FP1-2) 
 
The figure below shows the front panel 1-2. 
 
 
Figure A.11. The Front Panel of FP1-2 
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Figure A.12. Complete Code of FP1-2 
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Figure A.13. Code in Detail, Part 1 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.14. Code in Detail, Part 2 of FP1-2 
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Figure A.15. Code in Detail, Part 3 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.16. Code in Detail, Part 4 of FP1-2 
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Figure A.17. Code in Detail, Part 5 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.18. Code in Detail, Part 6 of FP1-2 
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Figure A.19. Code in Detail, Part 7 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.20. Code in Detail, Part 8 of FP1-2 
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Figure A.21. Code in Detail, Part 9 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.22. Code in Detail, Part 10 of FP1-2 
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Figure A.23. Code in Detail, Part 11 of FP1-2 
 
Figure A.24. Code in Detail, Part 12 of FP1-2 
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A.2.3 Front Panel 2 (FP2) 
 
The figure below shows the front panel 2. 
 
 
Figure A.25. The Front Panel of FP2 
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Figure A.26. Complete Code of FP2 
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Figure A.27. Code in Detail, Part 1 of FP2 
 
Figure A.28. Code in Detail, Part 2 of FP2 
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Figure A.29. Code in Detail, Part 3 of FP2 
 
Figure A.30. Code in Detail, Part 4 of FP2 
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A.2.4 Front Panel 3 (FP3) 
 
The figure below shows the front panel 3. 
 
 
Figure A.31. The Front Panel of FP3 
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Figure A.32. Complete Code of FP3 
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A.2.5 Front Panel with Main Code (FP-Main) 
 
The figure below shows the front panel that contains main code. 
 
 
Figure A.33. The Front Panel of FP-Main 
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Figure A.34. Complete Code of FP-Main. Breakdowns are shown in Figures A.35 through A.78. 
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Figure A.35. Code in Detail, Part 1 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.36. Code in Detail, Part 2 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.37. Code in Detail, Part 3 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.38. Code in Detail, Part 4 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.39. Code in Detail, Part 5 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.40. Code in Detail, Part 6 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.41. Code in Detail, Part 7 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.42. Code in Detail, Part 8 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.43. Code in Detail, Part 9 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.44. Code in Detail, Part 10 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.45. Code in Detail, Part 11 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.46. Code in Detail, Part 12 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.47. Code in Detail, Part 13 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.48. Code in Detail, Part 14 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.49. Code in Detail, Part 15 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.50. Code in Detail, Part 16 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.51. Code in Detail, Part 17 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.52. Code in Detail, Part 18 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.53. Code in Detail, Part 19 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.54. Code in Detail, Part 20 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.55. Code in Detail, Part 21 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.56. Code in Detail, Part 22 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.57. Code in Detail, Part 23 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.58. Code in Detail, Part 24 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.59. Code in Detail, Part 25 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.60. Code in Detail, Part 26 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.61. Code in Detail, Part 27 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.62. Code in Detail, Part 28 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.63. Code in Detail, Part 29 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.64. Code in Detail, Part 30 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.65. Code in Detail, Part 31 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.66. Code in Detail, Part 32 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.67. Code in Detail, Part 33 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.68. Code in Detail, Part 34 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.69. Code in Detail, Part 35 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.70. Code in Detail, Part 36 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.71. Code in Detail, Part 37 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.72. Code in Detail, Part 38 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.73. Code in Detail, Part 39 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.74. Code in Detail, Part 40 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.75. Code in Detail, Part 41 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.76. Code in Detail, Part 42 of FP-Main 
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Figure A.77. Code in Detail, Part 43 of FP-Main 
 
Figure A.78. Code in Detail, Part 44 of FP-Main 
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    A.3. SubVIs of Main Code 
 A.3.1. Core 
 
The figure below shows the core module. 
 
 
Figure A.79. The Front Panel of Core Main Code 
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Figure A.80. Complete Code of Core Main Code 
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Figure A.82. Complete Code of Control Rods Module 
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Figure A.83. The Front Panel of Initial Xenon Density Module 
 
 
 
Figure A.84. Complete Code of Initial Xenon Density Module 
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 A.3.2. Pressurizer Module 
 
The figure below shows the pressurizer module. 
 
 
Figure A.85. The Front Panel of Pressurizer Module 
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Figure A.86. Complete Code of Pressurizer Module 
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A.3.3. Steam Generator Module 
 
The figure below shows the steam generator module. 
 
Figure A.87. The Front Panel of Steam Generator Module 
 
Figure A.88. Complete Code of Steam Generator Module 
131 
 
A.3.4. Pump 
 
The figure below shows the pump module. 
 
Figure A.89. The Front Panel of Pump Module 
 
Figure A.90. Complete Code of Pump Module 
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A.3.5. Enthalpy Calculator 
 
The figure below shows the enthalpy calculator. 
 
 
 
Figure A.91. The Front Panel of Enthalpy Calculator for Primary Loop 
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Figure A.92. Complete Code of Enthalpy Calculator for Primary Loop 
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Figure A.93. The Front Panel of Enthalpy Calculator for Secondary Loop 
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Figure A.94. Complete Code of Enthalpy Calculator for Secondary Loop 
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A.3.6. Temperature Calculator 
 
Figure A.95. The Front Panel of Temperature Calculator 
 
Figure A.96. Complete Code of Temperature Calculator 
 
Figure A.97. The Front Panel of Saturated Temperature Calculator 
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Figure A.98. Complete Code of Saturated Temperature Calculator 
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APPENDIX B: FAULT INJECTION MODULE CODES 
 
The figure below shows the schematic diagram of the fault injection module in the simulator. 
 
 
Figure B.1. A Schematic Diagram for the Fault Injection Module Locations 
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    B.1. Fault List Manager (FLM) 
 B.1.1. FLM-Input 
 
The figure below shows the fault list manager for faulty input. 
 
 
Figure B.2. The Front Panel of FLM-Input 
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Figure B.3. Complete Code, Part 1 of FLM-Input 
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Figure B.4. Complete Code, Part 2 of FLM-Input 
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 B.1.2. FLM-Output 
 
The figure below shows the fault list manager for faulty output. 
 
 
Figure B.5. The Front Panel of FLM-Output 
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Figure B.6. Complete Code, Part 1 of FLM-Output 
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Figure B.7. Complete Code, Part 2 of FLM-Output 
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    B.2. Fault Injection Manager (FIM) 
 B.2.1. FIM-Input 
 
The figure below shows the fault injection manager for faulty input. 
 
 
Figure B.8. The Front Panel of FIM-Input 
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Figure B.9. Complete Code of FIM-Input 
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 B.2.2. FIM-Output 
 
The figure below shows the fault injection manager for faulty output. 
 
 
Figure B.10. The Front Panel of FIM-Output 
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Figure B.11. Complete Code of FIM-Output 
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    B.3. Result Analyzer (RA) 
 
The figure below shows the result analyzer. 
 
 
Figure B.12. The Structure of RA in the NPP Simulator 
 
Figure B.13. The Front Panel of the Comparison Module 
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Figure B.14. Complete Code of the Comparison Module 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The notations and dedicated numbers in Table C.1. are used in this chapter.  
Table C.1. Format of the Experimental Data 
Fault Location 1= Hotleg Temp, 2= Coldleg Temp, 3= Pressure, 4= Flowrate 
Fault Type 1 = SHIFT UP, 2 = SHIFT DOWN, 3 = CUT OUT, 4 = SIGNAL 
STUCK, 5 = NOISE  
MCR Status Safe Operation (OP), Operation with Cautions (OPC) Shutdown 
immediately (SS), Deceptive or Ambiguous (DoA) 
RA Status Detected (D), Undetected (UD) 
Alarm Alarm signal is from Tricon (On/Off) 
 
    C.1. Experimental Data of Single-Fault Injection 
Table C.2. Data of Single-Fault Injection on Hotleg Temperature 
Fault 
Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ran
ge 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
1 1 30 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 1 25 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 1 20 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 1 15 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 1 10 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 1 5 OP D OFF  
1 1 3 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
1 1 1 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
1 2 30 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 2 25 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
1 2 20 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with 
ignoring hotleg temp 
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Table C.2. (con’t) 
Faul
t Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ra
ng
e 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
1 2 15 OP D OF
F 
Caution: Operation with ignoring hotleg 
temp 
1 2 10 OP D OF
F 
Caution: Operation with ignoring hotleg 
temp 
1 2 5 OP D OF
F 
 
1 2 3 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
1 2 1 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
1 3 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring hotleg 
temp 
1 4 N/
A 
OP UD OF
F 
This case is hard to notice that there is a 
faulty sensor. Use alternative components. 
1 5 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring hotleg 
temp 
 
Table C.3. Data of Single-Fault Injection on Coldleg Temperature 
Fault 
Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ran
ge 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
2 1 30 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
2 1 25 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
2 1 20 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
2 1 15 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
2 1 10 OP D OFF Caution: Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
2 1 5 OP D OFF  
2 1 3 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
2 1 1 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
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Table C.3. (con’t) 
Faul
t Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ra
ng
e 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
2 2 30 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 2 25 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 2 20 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 2 15 OP D OF
F 
Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 2 10 OP D OF
F 
Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 2 5 OP D OF
F 
 
2 2 3 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
2 2 1 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
2 3 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
2 4 N/
A 
OP UD OF
F 
This case is hard to notice that there is a 
faulty sensor. Use alternative components. 
2 5 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring coldleg 
temp 
 
Table C.4. Data of Single-Fault Injection on Pressure 
Fault 
Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ran
ge 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
3 1 1.5 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring pressure 
3 1 1 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring pressure 
3 1 0.5 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring pressure 
3 1 0.3 OP D OFF  
3 1 0.1 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
3 2 1.5 OP D ON Caution: Operation with 
ignoring pressure 
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Table C.4. (con’t) 
Faul
t Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ra
ng
e 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
3 2 1 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring pressure 
3 2 0.5 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring pressure 
3 2 0.3 OP D OF
F 
 
3 2 0.1 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
3 3 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring pressure 
3 4 N/
A 
OP UD OF
F 
This case is hard to notice that there is a 
faulty sensor. Use alternative components. 
3 5 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring pressure 
 
Table C.5. Data of Single-Fault Injection on Flowrate 
Fault 
Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ran
ge 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
4 1 500 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 400 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 300 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 200 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 100 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 50 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 1 10 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
4 1 5 OP UD OFF The value is less than tolerance 
level 
4 2 500 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
4 2 400 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring 
one of pumps 
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Table C.5. (con’t) 
Faul
t Loc 
Fault 
Type 
Ra
ng
e 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
4 2 30
0 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
4 2 20
0 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
4 2 10
0 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
4 2 50 OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
4 2 10 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
4 2 5 OP UD OF
F 
The value is less than tolerance level 
4 3 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
4 4 N/
A 
OP UD OF
F 
This case is hard to notice that there is a 
faulty sensor. Use alternative components. 
4 5 N/
A 
OP D ON Caution: Operation with ignoring one of 
pumps 
 
    C.2. Experimental Data of Double-Fault Injection 
Table C.6. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Hotleg and Coldleg Temperatures 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 2) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
1 1 30 30 SS D, D ON  
  20 30 SS D, D ON  
  10 30 SS D, D ON  
  5 30 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
  30 20 SS D, D ON  
  20 20 SS D, D ON  
  10 20 SS D, D ON  
  5 20 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
coldleg temp 
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Table C.6. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 
2 (Loc 2) 
Rang
e 
(Loc1
) 
Rang
e 
(Loc2
) 
MC
R 
Stat
us 
RA 
Stat
us 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
  30 10 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
    20 10 OPC D, 
D 
OFF Insert CRs and keep the reactor with 
70~80% of power. Becareful withdrawing 
CRs. 
    10 10 OPC D, 
D 
OFF Insert CRs and keep the reactor with 
70~80% of power. Becareful withdrawing 
CRs. 
  5 10 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
  30 5 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
  20 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
  10 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
    5 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF   
1 2 30 30 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  20 30 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  10 30 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  5 30 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  30 20 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  20 20 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  10 20 SS D, 
D 
ON  
  5 20 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  30 10 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
    20 10 SS D, 
D 
OFF Operation depending on SG conditions 
    10 10 SS D, 
D 
OFF Operation depending on SG conditions 
  5 10 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
  30 5 OP D, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
  20 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
  10 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF  
    5 5 OP D, 
D 
OFF   
1 3 30 N/A SS D, 
D 
ON  
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Table C.6. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 2) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
MCR 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
  20 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
1 4 30 N/A OP D, 
UD 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
    20 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
    10 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
    5 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
1 5 30 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
    5 N/A SS D, D O
N 
  
2 1 30 30 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 30 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 30 SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 30 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  30 20 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 20 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 20 SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 20 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  30 10 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
    20 10 SS D, D OF
F 
Operation depending on SG conditions 
    10 10 SS D, D OF
F 
Operation depending on SG conditions 
  5 10 OP D, D OF
F 
 
  30 5 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
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Table C.6. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 2) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
MCR 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
  20 5 OP D, D OF
F 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp 
  10 5 OP D, D OF
F 
 
    5 5 OP D, D OF
F 
  
2 2 30 30 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    20 30 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    10 30 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    5 30 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    30 20 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    20 20 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    10 20 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  5 20 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  30 10 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    20 10 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    10 10 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  5 10 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  30 5 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  20 5 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
  10 5 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
    5 5 DoA D, D OF
F 
Caution: Do not pull up the CRs (Super critical 
issue) 
2 3 30 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
2 4 30 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
    20 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
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Table C.6. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 2) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
MCR 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
    10 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
    5 N/A DoA D, 
UD 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
2 5 30 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
    5 N/A SS D, D O
N 
  
3 1 N/A 30 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 20 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 10 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 5 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
3 2 N/A 30 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 20 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 10 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 5 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
3 3 N/A N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
3 4 N/A N/A DoA D, 
UD 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
3 5 N/A N/A SS D, D O
N 
  
4 1 N/A 30 DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
    N/A 20 DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
    N/A 10 DoA UD, 
D 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
    N/A 5 DoA UD, 
D 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
4 2 N/A 30 DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
    N/A 20 DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
    N/A 10 DoA UD, 
D 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
    N/A 5 DoA UD, 
D 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
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Table C.6. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 2) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
MCR 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
4 3 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
4 4 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
UD 
OF
F 
Caution: Sensor failures on both hotleg and 
coldleg temperatures are hard to be detected 
4 5 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
D 
O
N 
Caution: Sensor failure on hotleg temp is hard 
to be detected 
5 1 N/A 30 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 20 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 10 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 5 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
5 2 N/A 30 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 20 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 10 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
  N/A 5 SS D, D O
N 
Check the RA module before actions 
5 3 N/A N/A SS D, D O
N 
 
5 4 N/A N/A DoA D, 
UD 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on coldleg temp is hard to be 
detected 
5 5 N/A N/A SS D, D O
N 
  
 
Table C.7. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Hotleg Temperature and Pressure 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
1 1 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
161 
 
Table C.7. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
1 2 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
1 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
pressure 
  5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
pressure 
1 4 30 N/A OPC D, UD ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
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Table C.7. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
    20 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
    10 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Caution: Sensor failure 
on press is hard to detect 
    5 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Caution: Sensor failure 
on press is hard to detect 
1 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
pressure 
    5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
pressure 
2 1 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
2 2 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
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Table C.7. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
2 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
  5 N/A OP D, D ON  
2 4 30 N/A OPC D, UD ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
    20 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
    10 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Caution: Sensor failure 
on press is hard to detect 
    5 N/A OPC D, UD OFF Caution: Sensor failure 
on press is hard to detect 
2 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
    5 N/A OP D, D ON   
3 1 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
3 2 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
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Table C.7. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
3 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
3 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
3 5 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp 
4 1 N/A 1.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 1 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OPC UD, D OFF  
4 2 N/A 1.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 1 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OPC UD, D OFF  
4 3 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON  
4 4 N/A N/A OPC UD, UD OFF Caution: Sensor failures 
on both hotleg temp and 
press are hard to detect 
4 5 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON   
5 1 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
5 2 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
5 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON  
5 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Operation with ignoring 
hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Sensor failure on press is 
hard to detect 
5 5 N/A N/A OP D, D ON   
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Table C.8. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Hotleg Temperature and Flowrate 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Rang
e 
(Loc1
) 
Rang
e 
(Loc4
) 
MC
R 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
1 1 30 500 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 500 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 500 SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 500 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
  30 300 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 300 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 300 SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 300 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
  30 100 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 100 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 100 SS D, D O
N 
 
  5 100 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
  30 50 SS D, D O
N 
 
  20 50 SS D, D O
N 
 
  10 50 SS D, D O
N 
 
    5 50 OP D, D O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
1 2 30 500 DoA D, D O
N 
Caution: If operator increases the flowrate and pull 
down CRs to decrease the hotleg temp, it may 
causes a power loss 
    20 500 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    10 500 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    5 500 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    30 300 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    20 300 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    10 300 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    5 300 DoA D, D O
N 
  
    30 100 DoA D, D O
N 
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Table C.8. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Rang
e 
(Loc1
) 
Rang
e 
(Loc4
) 
MC
R 
Statu
s 
RA 
Stat
us 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
    20 100 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    10 100 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    5 100 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    30 50 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    20 50 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    10 50 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    5 50 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
1 3 30 N/A SS D, 
D 
O
N 
 
  20 N/A SS D, 
D 
O
N 
 
  10 N/A OP D, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
  5 N/A OP D, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
1 4 30 N/A OP D, 
UD 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Failed flowrate sensor may be hard to detect 
  20 N/A OP D, 
UD 
O
FF 
Operation with ignoring hotleg temp/ Caution: 
Failed flowrate sensor may be hard to detect 
  10 N/A OP D, 
UD 
O
FF 
Caution: Failed flowrate sensor may be hard to 
detect 
  5 N/A OP D, 
UD 
O
FF 
Caution: Failed flowrate sensor may be hard to 
detect 
1 5 30 N/A SS D, 
D 
O
N 
 
  20 N/A SS D, 
D 
O
N 
 
  10 N/A OP D, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
    5 N/A OP D, 
D 
O
N 
Operation with ignoring flowrate 
2 1 30 500 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
Dangerous Case: If operator decreases the flowrate 
and pull up CRs to increase the hotleg temp, it may 
causes an accident 
    20 500 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
Hard to notice that there is a fault on the system 
    10 500 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    5 500 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    30 300 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
  
    20 300 DoA D, 
D 
O
N 
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Table C.8. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
    10 300 DoA D, D ON   
    5 300 DoA D, D ON   
    30 100 DoA D, D ON   
    20 100 DoA D, D ON   
    10 100 DoA D, D ON   
    5 100 DoA D, D ON   
    30 50 DoA D, D ON   
    20 50 DoA D, D ON   
    10 50 DoA D, D ON   
    5 50 DoA D, D ON   
2 2 30 500 OP D, D ON  
  20 500 OP D, D ON  
  10 500 OP D, D ON  
  5 500 OP D, D ON  
  30 300 OP D, D ON  
  20 300 OP D, D ON  
  10 300 OP D, D ON  
  5 300 OP D, D ON  
  30 100 OP D, D ON  
  20 100 OP D, D ON  
  10 100 OP D, D ON  
  5 100 OP D, D ON  
  30 50 OP D, D ON  
  20 50 OP D, D ON  
  10 50 OP D, D ON  
    5 50 OP D, D ON   
2 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and 
make a decision 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and 
make a decision 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and 
make a decision 
  5 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and 
make a decision 
2 4 30 N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect 
  20 N/A DoA D, UD OFF Caution: hard to detect 
  10 N/A DoA D, UD OFF Caution: hard to detect 
  5 N/A DoA D, UD OFF Caution: hard to detect 
2 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and 
make a decision 
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Table C.8. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and make a decision 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and make a decision 
  5 N/A OP D, D ON Check coldleg temp and make a decision 
3 1 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 2 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 3 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
3 4 N/A N/A DoA D, 
UD 
ON Caution: hard to detect 
3 5 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
4 1 N/A 500 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 300 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 100 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 50 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
4 2 N/A 500 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 300 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 100 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
    N/A 50 DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
4 3 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
4 4 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
UD 
OF
F 
Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
4 5 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
D 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
5 1 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 2 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
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Table C.8. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 1) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Statu
s 
Al
ar
m 
Comment 
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 3 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
5 4 N/A N/A DoA D, 
UD 
ON Operation with ignoring flowrate. Check 
the coldleg temp and insert CRs if needed 
5 5 N/A N/A SS D, D ON   
 
Table C.9. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Coldleg Temperature and Pressure 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alarm Comment 
1 1 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
1 2 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
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Table C.9. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alarm Comment 
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D OFF  
    5 0.3 OP D, D OFF   
1 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
  5 N/A OP D, D ON  
1 4 30 N/A OPC D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect 
  20 N/A OPC D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect 
  10 N/A OPC D, UD  Caution: hard to detect 
  5 N/A OPC D, UD  Caution: hard to detect 
1 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
    5 N/A OP D, D ON   
2 1 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D   
    5 0.3 OP D, D     
2 2 30 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 1.5 OP D, D ON  
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Table C.9. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alarm Comment 
  30 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 1 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 1 OP D, D ON  
  5 1 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.5 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  5 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  30 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 0.3 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 0.3 OP D, D   
    5 0.3 OP D, D     
2 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
  5 N/A OP D, D ON  
2 4 30 N/A OPC D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect 
  20 N/A OPC D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect 
  10 N/A OPC D, UD  Caution: hard to detect 
  5 N/A OPC D, UD  Caution: hard to detect 
2 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring coldleg temp 
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
    5 N/A OP D, D ON   
3 1 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
3 2 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
3 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level 
3 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Check the PRZ level 
3 5 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level 
4 1 N/A 1.5 OPC UD, D ON Caution: hard to detect 
  N/A 1 OPC UD, D ON  
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Table C.9. (con’t) 
Fault 
Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault 
Type 2 
(Loc 3) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alarm Comment 
  N/A 0.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OPC UD, D   
4 2 N/A 1.5 OPC UD, D ON Caution: hard to detect 
  N/A 1 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OPC UD, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OPC UD, D   
4 3 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON Caution: hard to detect 
4 4 N/A N/A OPC UD, 
UD 
 Caution: hard to detect 
4 5 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON Caution: hard to detect 
5 1 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level/ Ignoring coldleg temp 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
5 2 N/A 1.5 OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level/ Ignoring coldleg temp 
  N/A 1 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.5 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 0.3 OP D, D ON  
5 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level/ Ignoring coldleg temp 
5 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Check the PRZ level/ Ignoring coldleg temp 
5 5 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Check the PRZ level/ Ignoring coldleg temp 
 
Table C.10. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Coldleg Temperature and Flowrate 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
1 1 30 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate and coldleg temp 
  20 500 OP D, D ON  
  10 500 OP D, D ON  
  5 500 OP D, D ON  
  30 300 OP D, D ON  
  20 300 OP D, D ON  
  10 300 OP D, D ON  
  5 300 OP D, D ON  
  30 100 OP D, D ON  
  20 100 OP D, D ON  
  10 100 OP D, D ON  
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Table C.10. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
  5 100 OP D, D ON  
  30 50 OP D, D ON  
  20 50 OP D, D ON  
  10 50 OP D, D ON  
    5 50 OP D, D ON   
1 2 30 500 OP D, D ON Insert CRs and operation with 
70~80% of power 
  20 500 OP D, D ON  
  10 500 OP D, D ON  
  5 500 OP D, D ON  
  30 300 OP D, D ON Insert CRs and operation with 
70~80% of power 
  20 300 OP D, D ON  
  10 300 OP D, D ON  
  5 300 OP D, D ON  
  30 100 OP D, D ON Insert CRs and operation with 
70~80% of power 
  20 100 OP D, D ON  
  10 100 OP D, D ON  
  5 100 OP D, D ON  
  30 50 OP D, D ON Insert CRs and operation with 
70~80% of power 
  20 50 OP D, D ON  
  10 50 OP D, D ON  
    5 50 OP D, D ON   
1 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate and coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON  
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
  5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate 
1 4 30 N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect failure 
  20 N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect failure 
  10 N/A DoA D, UD OF
F 
Caution: hard to detect failure 
  5 N/A DoA D, UD OF
F 
Caution: hard to detect failure 
1 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate and coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON  
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
    5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate 
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Table C.10. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
2 1 30 500 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    20 500 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    10 500 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    5 500 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    30 300 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    20 300 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    10 300 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    5 300 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    30 100 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    20 100 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    10 100 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    5 100 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    30 50 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    20 50 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    10 50 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
    5 50 DoA D, D ON Decreasing flowrate may lead an 
accident. Insert CRs to avoid 
unanticipated transient 
2 2 30 500 OP D, D ON  
  20 500 OP D, D ON  
  10 500 OP D, D ON  
  5 500 OP D, D ON  
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Table C.10. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  30 300 OP D, D ON  
  20 300 OP D, D ON  
  10 300 OP D, D ON  
  5 300 OP D, D ON  
  30 100 OP D, D ON  
  20 100 OP D, D ON  
  10 100 OP D, D ON  
  5 100 OP D, D ON  
  30 50 OP D, D ON  
  20 50 OP D, D ON  
  10 50 OP D, D ON  
    5 50 OP D, D ON   
2 3 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate and coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON  
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
  5 N/A OP D, D ON  
2 4 30 N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect failure 
  20 N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect failure 
  10 N/A DoA D, UD OFF Caution: hard to detect failure 
  5 N/A DoA D, UD OFF Caution: hard to detect failure 
2 5 30 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate and coldleg temp 
  20 N/A OP D, D ON  
  10 N/A OP D, D ON  
    5 N/A OP D, D ON   
3 1 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 2 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 3 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
3 4 N/A N/A DoA D, UD ON Caution: hard to detect failure 
3 5 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
4 1 N/A 500 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
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Table C.10. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 2) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  N/A 300 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
  N/A 100 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
  N/A 50 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
4 2 N/A 500 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
  N/A 300 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
  N/A 100 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
  N/A 50 DoA UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ Caution: hard to detect 
failure on coldleg temp 
4 3 N/A N/A DoA UD, D ON  
4 4 N/A N/A DoA UD, 
UD 
OFF Caution: hard to detect failure 
4 5 N/A N/A DoA UD, D ON  
5 1 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 2 N/A 500 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 300 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 100 SS D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 3 N/A N/A SS D, D ON  
5 4 N/A N/A DoA D, UD ON  
5 5 N/A N/A SS D, D ON   
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Table C.11. Data of Double-Fault Injection on Pressure and Flowrate 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 3) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
1 1 1.5 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 500 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  1 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 300 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  1 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 100 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  1 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 50 OP D, D ON  
1 2 1.5 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 500 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  1 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 300 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  1 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 100 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  1 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 50 OP D, D ON  
1 3 1.5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.5 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.3 N/A OP D, D ON  
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Table C.11. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc 3) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Ala
rm 
Comment 
1 4 1.5 N/A OPC D, UD ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  1 N/A OPC D, UD ON  
  0.5 N/A OPC D, UD ON  
  0.3 N/A OPC D, UD   
1 5 1.5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.5 N/A OP D, D ON  
    0.3 N/A OP D, D ON   
2 1 1.5 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 500 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  1 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 300 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  1 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 100 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  1 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 50 OP D, D ON  
2 2 1.5 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 500 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 500 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  1 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 300 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 300 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  1 100 OP D, D ON  
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Table C.11. (con’t) 
Fault Type 
1 (Loc 3) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
  0.5 100 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 100 OP D, D ON  
  1.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  1 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.5 50 OP D, D ON  
  0.3 50 OP D, D ON  
2 3 1.5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.5 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.3 N/A OP D, D ON  
2 4 1.5 N/A OPC D, UD ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  1 N/A OPC D, UD ON  
  0.5 N/A OPC D, UD ON  
  0.3 N/A OPC D, UD   
2 5 1.5 N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  1 N/A OP D, D ON  
  0.5 N/A OP D, D ON  
    0.3 N/A OP D, D ON   
3 1 N/A 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  N/A 300 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 100 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 2 N/A 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  N/A 300 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 100 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
3 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
3 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
3 5 N/A N/A OP UD, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
4 1 N/A 500 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 300 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 100 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 50 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
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Table C.11. (con’t) 
Fault Type 
1 (Loc 3) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc 4) 
Range 
(Loc3) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
Comment 
4 2 N/A 500 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 300 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 100 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
  N/A 50 OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
4 3 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
4 4 N/A N/A OPC UD, 
UD 
  Caution: hard to detect sensors 
failure. Insert CRs while making 
frther decisions. 
4 5 N/A N/A OPC UD, D ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
5 1 N/A 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  N/A 300 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 100 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 2 N/A 500 OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
  N/A 300 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 100 OP D, D ON  
  N/A 50 OP D, D ON  
5 3 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
5 4 N/A N/A OPC D, UD ON Check PRZ level, hotleg and 
coldleg temperature 
5 5 N/A N/A OP D, D ON Operation with ignoring 
flowrate/ check PRZ level 
 
    C.3. Experimental Data of Triple-Fault Injection 
Table C.12. Data of Triple-Fault Injection on Hotleg and Coldleg Temperatures and 
Flowrate 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc2) 
Fault Type 3 
(Loc4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
2 2 1 30 30 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 30 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 30 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 30 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 20 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
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Table C.12. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc2) 
Fault Type 3 
(Loc4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
   20 20 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 20 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 20 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 10 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 10 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 10 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 10 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 5 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 5 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 5 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 5 500 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 30 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 30 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 30 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 30 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 20 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 20 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 20 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 20 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 10 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 10 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 10 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 10 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 5 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 5 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 5 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 5 300 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 30 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 30 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 30 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 30 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 20 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 20 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 20 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 20 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 10 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 10 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 10 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
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Table C.12. (con’t) 
Fault Type 1 
(Loc1) 
Fault Type 2 
(Loc2) 
Fault Type 3 
(Loc4) 
Range 
(Loc1) 
Range 
(Loc2) 
Range 
(Loc4) 
MCR 
Status 
RA 
Status 
Alar
m 
      5 10 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 5 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 5 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 5 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 5 100 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 30 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 30 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 30 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 30 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 20 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 20 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 20 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 20 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 10 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 10 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 10 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 10 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      30 5 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      20 5 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      10 5 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
      5 5 50 DoA D, D, D ON 
4 4 4 n/a n/a n/a DoA ND, ND, 
ND 
OFF 
 
  
183 
 
APPENDIX D: OPERATING MANUAL OF NPP SIMULATOR 
 
The operating manual explains all features in the control and informative panels. It also 
guides the initial conditions for the steady-state operation of the NPP simulator and the 
methods to use the fault injection tool.  
 
    D.1. Explanation of the Informative Panels (FP 1-1 and 1-2) 
 
The panels (FP 1-1 and 1-2) are the informative front panels that displays all information 
about the state of the reactor. Both panels have the same information. Operator is able to 
choose whatever he/she wants to display on each panel (Figure 2.9 in section 2.2). 
 
Tab Control
 
Figure D.1. First Front Panel on TV1 and TV2 [11] (Figure 2.9). 
The meanings of each component in each panel are explained below. 
184 
 
 
Figure D.2. Details of the “Entire Condition” on the Front Panel 1-1 and 1-2. 
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Figure D.3. The “Detail Information” on the Front Panel 1-1 and 1-2. 
 
The table below explains all buttons, graphs, gauges, thermometers, and alarms. 
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Table D.1. Explanations of the “Detail Information” on the Front Panel 1-1 and 1-2. 
Buttons 
Core Switch to display the core information 
Pressurizer Switch to display the pressurizer information 
Pump 1/2 Switch to display the pumps 1 and 2 information 
Pump 3/4 Switch to display the pumps 3 and 4 information 
SG 1 Switch to display the steam generator 1 information 
SG 2 Switch to display the steam generator 2 information 
SG 3 Switch to display the steam generator 3 information 
SG 4 Switch to display the steam generator 4 information 
“Core” 
N Normalized power level graph 
C Neutron precursor graph 
Reactivity Reactivity graph 
Xenon Xenon level graph 
T_Fuel Fuel temperature 
Mod_CT Moderator temperature at center 
Mod_Out Moderator temperature at outlet 
“SG1/SG2/SG3/SG4” 
Press_Pri_SG# Pressure gauge for primary loop in the steam generator 
Press_Sec_SG# Pressure gauge for secondary loop in the steam generator 
Flow_Pri_SG# Flowrate for primary loop in the steam generator 
Flow_Sec_SG# Flowrate for secondary loop in the steam generator 
T_Pri_In_SG# Temperature for primary inlet in the steam generator 
T_Pri_Out_SG# Temperature for primary outlet in the steam generator 
T_Sec_In_SG# Temperature for secondary inlet in the steam generator 
T_Sec_Out_SG# Temperature for secondary outlet in the steam generator 
“Pressurizer” 
P_Pressurizer Pressure in pressurizer graph 
TANK_LEVEL_ 
Pressurizer 
Tank level in pressurizer graph 
TANK_LEVEL Tank level indicator 
T_Press Temperature in pressurizer 
Pressurizer Pressure gauge in pressurizer 
Pressurizer_Zoom 
In 
Pressure (zoom in) gauge in pressurizer 
“Pump 1/2 and 3/4" 
Pressure_P# Pressure gauge in the pump 
RPM_P# RPM gauge of the pump 
Flow_P# Flowrate in the pump 
Pump Power P# The power consumed in the pump 
Temp P# Water temperature in the pump 
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Table D.1. (con’t) 
Valve Open_P# Valve position of the pump 
Alarms 
Fuel Temp Fuel temperature warning 
Mod Temp Moderator temperature warning 
P_Prsszr Pressure in pressurizer warning 
Tank_Level Tank level in pressurizer warning 
PP#_RPM RPM of the pump warning 
PP#_Press Pressure in the pump warning 
SG#_FLP Primary flow warning of the steam generator 
SG#_FLS Secondary flow warning of the steam generator 
SG#_TP_IN Primary inlet temperature warning of the steam generator 
SG#_TP_OUT Primary outlet temperature warning of the steam generator 
SG#_TS_IN Seconadry inlet temperature warning of the steam generator 
SG#_TS_OUT Secondary outlet temperature warning of the steam generator 
Alarm on the “V
alve Open_P#” 
The alarm is on when the valve is fully closed 
UP_Sec_SG# This indicates the secondary flow increases automatically 
Down_Sec_SG# This indicates the secondary flow decreases automatically 
  
 
    D.2. Initial Conditions and Controls 
 
This section explains about the initial conditions to start the reactor at steady-state and the 
controllers. The front panel 2 and 3 have all features to control the NPP simulator, while the 
main code has all the features for the fault injection.  
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
D.2.1. Front Panel 2 
Figure D.4. The Front Panel of FP2. 
This front panel contains initial conditions, SCRAM button, and controllers for core, 
pressurizer, and pumps in the primary loop. The detailed information of each feature is 
explained in the Table D.2. 
 
Table D.2. Explanations of the “Detail Information” on the Front Panel 2. 
"Initial Conditions" 
Initial 
Reactivity 
($)  
This is the initial reactivity (default is 4.01). It may be different depending 
on the initial moderator temperature and the positions of control rods. 
dt time step (default is 0.01) 
T_c_inlet Initial moderator temperature (default is 290) 
P(bar) Initial pressure (default is 155 bar) 
m_dot_pu
mp 
Initial flowrate for all pumps (default is 17676) 
CR_# Initial position of each control rod (default is 10) 
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Table D.2. (con’t) 
Buttons 
Stop Stop the simulator 
SCRAM SCRAM of the reactor 
CR Ctrl This button should be pressed before controlling the control rods. 
ALL RODS 
UP/DOWN 
Insert/withdraw all control rods 
CR# UP/DOWN Insert/withdraw each control rod (# assigned) 
Spray This button turns on or off the spray in the pressurizer 
Heater This button turns on or off the heater in the pressurizer 
Controllers 
Spray Knob This knob controls the amount of spray splashed in the pressurizer 
Heater Knob This knob controls the amount of heat generated by the heater in the 
pressurizer 
RPM_Pump# Control RPM of each pump (default is 1189) 
Valve Open_P# Control valve of each pump (default is 100) 
Simulation 
SPEED 
It controls the speed of the simulation (sliding left: fast simulation, 
sliding right: slow simulation) 
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D.2.2. Front Panel 3 
 
 
Figure D.5. The Front Panel of FP3. 
This front panel has the flowrate information of the steam generators and controllers of 
pumps in the secondary loop. Since the NPP simulator does not have a secondary loop yet, 
the controllers for the secondary pumps are inactive. The flowrate information for the steam 
generators displays the same information that explained in the previous section (section 
Appendix D.1). 
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D.2.3. Front Panel of Main Code 
 
Figure D.6. The Front Panel of Main Code. 
This front panel has all controllers for the fault injection. It has the fault list loaders, manual 
fault injecting tools, and the result analyzer. The detailed explanation is in Table D.4. 
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Table D.4. Explanations of the “Detail Information” on the Front Panel of Main Code. 
"LOAD Fault List File" 
file path_Input It loads a text file that contains all the information for the input fault 
injection 
file 
path_Output 
It loads a text file that contains all the information for the output fault 
injection 
"FI Switch" 
Switch It controls the way of injecting faults either manually or randomly 
"Faulty Lists in the text files" 
# of Comp. (In) The number of faulty locations of each component (core, prz, pump, 
SG) for input fault injection 
# of Comp. 
(Out) 
The number of faulty locations of each component (core, prz, pump, 
SG) for output fault injection 
# of Digital The number of digital typed faults 
# of Analog The number of analog typed faults 
"INPUT" 
Core IN Manual input fault injection button in the core 
Press IN Manual input fault injection button in the pressurizer 
Pump IN Manual input fault injection button in the pump 
SG IN Manual input fault injection button in the SG 
Selector (Core) Select the faulty location in the core 
Selector (Press) Select the faulty location in the pressurizer 
Selector (Pump) Select the faulty location in the pump 
Selector (SG) Select the faulty location in the SG 
Selector 
(Fault_Core) 
Select the fault type (core) 
Selector 
(Fault_Press) 
Select the fault type (pressurizer) 
Selector 
(Fault_Pump) 
Select the fault type (pump) 
Selector 
(Fault_SG) 
Select the fault type (SG) 
"OUTPUT" 
Core OUT Manual output fault injection button in the core 
Press OUT Manual output fault injection button in the pressurizer 
Pump OUT Manual output fault injection button in the pump 
SG OUT Manual output fault injection button in the SG 
Selector (Core) Select the faulty location in the core 
Selector (Press) Select the faulty location in the pressurizer 
Selector (Pump) Select the faulty location in the pump 
Selector (SG) Select the faulty location in the SG 
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Table D.4. (con’t) 
Selector 
(Fault_Core)/Button 
Select the digital fault type (core) 
Selector 
(Fault_Press)/Button 
Select the digital fault type (press) 
Selector (Fault_Core) Select the fault type (core) 
Selector (Fault_Press) Select the fault type (pressurizer) 
Selector (Fault_Pump) Select the fault type (pump) 
Selector (Fault_SG) Select the fault type (SG) 
Fault Range (Core) Determine the range of the analog typed fault (core) 
Fault Range (Press) Determine the range of the analog typed fault (pressurizer) 
Fault Range (SG) Determine the range of the analog typed fault (SG) 
Fault Range (Pump) Determine the range of the analog typed fault (pump) 
"Status of the Fault Injection" 
FI Input Alarm is on when the input faulty signal is injected 
FI Output Alarm is on when the output faulty signal is injected 
Variable It displays the faulty locations for each component 
Fault Type It displays the types of faults for each component 
"Result Analyzer" 
Fault Alarm is on when the RA detects a faulty signal 
Core Alarm is on when the detected faulty signal is from the core 
Pump Alarm is on when the detected faulty signal is from the 
pump 
Prz Alarm is on when the detected faulty signal is from the 
pressurizer 
SG Alarm is on when the detected faulty signal is from the SG 
"Tricon" 
Core_Tricon Alarm is on when the Tricon diagnoses a problem in the 
core 
Prz_Tricon Alarm is on when the Tricon diagnoses a problem in the 
pressurizer 
SG_Tricon Alarm is on when the Tricon diagnoses a problem in the SG 
Pump_Tricon Alarm is on when the Tricon diagnoses a problem in the 
pump 
 
